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On the 23rd of June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) held a referendum in which it voted to 
leave the European Union (EU) – an event now known as Brexit. The UK’s impending 
departure could have severe economic and political implications for New Zealand with respect 
to agricultural trade.  
 
New Zealand and the UK have a strong relationship established during colonial times. This 
consequently formed the basis of New Zealand’s ensuing agriculture relationship with the EU 
that has been limited due to competing interests. However, with the UK initiating the process 
of Brexit there is a chance to re-assess the economic trade relationship with both the UK and 
the EU via Free Trade Agreements (FTA). New Zealand needs to adapt to the changing 
international political economy, while simultaneously evolving its relationships with both the 
UK and EU, as they undergo changes to their respective regional and domestic politics. 
Subsequently, New Zealand will have to navigate considerable uncertainty to avoid the 
negative implications created so that New Zealand can embrace the opportunities that have 
presented themselves via the process of ‘Brexit’. 
 
This thesis explores the short and long term diplomatic and trade risks and opportunities for 
New Zealand’s agriculture sector. Through a review of literature and interviews with fifteen 
key informants in the field of trade policy, this thesis examines how New Zealand should 
position itself to maximise leverage and influence the subsequent international trade 
negotiations that have resulted from Brexit disrupting the international political economy. Key 
findings emphasise significant questions about uncertainty concerning New Zealand’s future 
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Agricultural Exports: standard WTO definition for agriculture. Products include Harmonised System 
(HS) codes 1–24 inclusive, with the exception of HS 03 and some of HS 16 (processed fish). It also 
includes casein, hides and skins, and raw wool. 
 
Common Agriculture Policy: The objectives, set out in the Treaty of Rome, included increased 
productivity, provision of a fair standard of living for the agriculture community, the stabilization of 
markets, security of food supplies, and provision of food to consumers at reasonable prices. In effect, 
it involves a massive transfer of resources from non‐farmers to farmers, has protected EU farmers 
from international competition, and has artificially inflated food prices. 
 
Comparative Advantage: The theory of comparative advantage holds that nations should produce 
and export those goods. They can produce at a lower cost than other nations and import those items 
that other nations can produce at lower cost.  
 
Customs Union: A group of nations that agrees to eliminate barriers among themselves and adopt a 
unified system of external trade barriers.  
 
European Economic Community (EEC): The original European common market of six countries 
created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
 
European Union (EU): Successor to the European Economic Community (EEC). Single market and 
customs union with a freedom of movement of labour and capital.  
 
Free Trade: In keeping with the laissez-faire notion that government intervention in the economy 
undermines efficiency and overall wealth, free trade removes protectionist measures (tariffs, quotas, 
etc.) that are designed to insulate domestic producers from international competition.  
 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA): A treaty between two or more countries, establishing a free trade 
area. 
 
Most favoured nation (MFN): A trade principle under the WTO, whereby imports from a nation are 
granted the same degree of preference as those from the most preferred nations. 
 
Protectionism: The doctrine or practice of restricting international trade to favour home producers, 





Quotas: A limited quantity of a particular product which under official controls can be produced, 
exported, or imported. 
 
Single Market: an association of countries trading with each other without restrictions or tariffs. 
 
Tariffs: a tax or duty to be paid on a particular class of imports or exports. 
 
Trade Rate Quotas: Tariff quota allocations are calculated based on the quantities available within 
the tariff quota and the quantity applied for. 
 
World Trade Organisation (WTO): where countries negotiate the rules of international trade. 
 
WTO Rules: if members don’t have an FTA they trade under “WTO Rules”. 
 







Chapter One – Introduction 
 
1.1 Brexit: An emotional response and an economic problem 
 
On the 23rd of June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) held a referendum in which it voted to leave the 
European Union (EU) – now known as Brexit. It is often assumed that as a small state in the South 
Pacific Ocean, New Zealand is extraordinarily vulnerable to political and economic global shocks and 
susceptible to changes to the rules and institutions that govern the international political economy 
and international trade (Fox, 1959; Köllner, 2018; Sam, 2015). The UK’s impending departure could 
have severe economic and political implications for New Zealand with respect to agricultural trade, as 
the rules governing trade access into the EU are being rewritten.  
 
The changes to the rules governing the international political economy include a proposal to split 
Trade Rate Quota’s (TRQ’s) down historical lines (Honey, 2017). Further, with no ‘divorce’ plan 
governing trade between the UK and the EU post-Brexit agreed to, New Zealand’s global supply 
chain is under threat, with increased tariffs and customs confusion (BusinessEurope, 2018). In 
addition, the impact upon the UK’s economy could inspire even greater problems for New Zealand 
agriculture exporters. New Zealand has a heavy reliance on agriculture in which they maintain a 
comparative advantage (Finny, 2018, pp. 26-27; Woodfield, 2008, p. 7). In 2018, New Zealand is the 
world’s 12th largest agriculture exporter (by value) (MPI, 2018).  
 
New Zealand and the UK have a strong political relationship established during colonial times. This 
consequently formed the basis of the ensuing political and trade relationship with the EU, when the 
UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC), the EU’s predecessor, in 1973 (Woodfield, 
2008, p. 7). Joining the EEC forced New Zealand to adapt its economic systems and political identity 
to adopt a competitive trading position through becoming a market liberal economy (Keating, 2016; 
McNeill, 2016; Woodfield, 2008, p. 7). Now highly regarded worldwide as an exporter and trading 
nation, the historical choices by the UK in the late 20th century helped create New Zealand’s 
contemporary trade identity (Hoadley, 2017; Keating, 2016).   
 
The EU is the world’s largest single market with 500 million consumers and the largest trader in the 
world of manufactured goods and services (Obadovic, 2018, p. 10). Currently, New Zealand and the 
EU’s trade relationship is governed by the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle and country specific 
tariff quotas (TRQ’s), established through a series of negotiations in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Obadovic, 2018, p. 2). As noted in Figure 1, The EU is New Zealand’s 




as agriculture is one of the most protected industries in international trade (Hoadley, 2017; Woodfield, 
2008).   





The agriculture sector is important to the EU, as it continues to be a relatively large producer and 
exporter of agricultural products (Obadovic, 2018, p. 10). The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) is a 
protectionist policy measure employed to protect the EU’s domestic agriculture producers and 
market, but CAP compromises small states agriculture trade through distorting the international 
market (Woodfield, 2008) (Finny, 2018, pp. 26-27). Large states tend to dominate smaller states in 
the international political economy by leveraging access to markets to coerce smaller states to accept 
the status quo (Drezner, 2008, p. 20). The Single Market and a common trade policy have made it 
possible for the EU to leverage between opening markets and protecting its interests in agriculture 
(Obadovic, 2018, p. 10).  
 
This has created an asymmetrical power imbalance between the EU and New Zealand (Hoadley, 
2017; Jones & Commonwealth, 2013; Woodfield, 2008). New Zealand is one of only six World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) states without a concluded Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU (MFAT, 
2017a). There are high levels of internal opposition to opening the EU’s agriculture market to New 
Zealand due to New Zealand’s comparative advantage in agriculture trade (Woodfield, 2008). New 
Zealand has had to fight to secure and maintain access to markets for agriculture exports – meat, 
dairy products and fruit – shown in Figure 2 to be their main sector of exports, due to the constraining 












Small states have often proven themselves to be adaptable to changes in the international system 
due to an inherent ability of consensus that larger states are unable to replicate due to their size 
(Katzenstein, 1985) (Jones & Commonwealth, 2013, p. 1). But small states must anticipate, prepare 
and respond accordingly to these global shocks (Buchanan, 2010). New Zealand needs to adapt to 
the changing international political economy, while simultaneously evolving its relationships with both 
the UK and EU as they undergo changes to their respective regional and domestic politics. 
Subsequently, New Zealand will have to navigate considerable uncertainty to avoid the negative 
implications created, so that New Zealand can embrace the opportunities that have presented 
themselves via the process of ‘Brexit’. 
 
With the UK initiating the process of Brexit, tension has emerged between the UK and the EU due to 
the competing objectives and interests of what the final withdrawal treaty of Brexit will look like. The 
UK needs to make Brexit a success, while the EU needs to prove that Brexit was a mistake (Barber, 
2018; Three, 2017). These competing objectives have opened up a trade opportunity with both the 
UK and the EU via FTA’s. There is also the potential to influence a reformed CAP. This thesis 
explores the short and long term diplomatic and trade risks and opportunities for New Zealand’s 
agriculture sector and examines how New Zealand should position itself to maximise leverage and 
influence the subsequent international trade negotiations that have resulted from Brexit disrupting the 























1.2 Relevance  
 
The international political economy is in the process of rewriting the rules due to Brexit. Whether 
these impacts are positive or negative will depend on how New Zealand government and businesses 
adapt to Brexit.  
 
Creating greater market access into the EU would be an amazing coup for New Zealand, as it is a 
huge, high value market that has relatively untapped potential (Patterson, 2018a). New Zealand has 
been unable to make much headway with the EU beyond their initial MFN status, as it is a difficult 
task to assimilate New Zealand competitive agricultural exports into an FTA with the EU’s heavily 
protected agriculture market (Obadovic, 2018, p. 199). This thesis comes at a critical and useful time 
as the New Zealand government is being confronted by the potentially damaging impacts of Brexit, 
while also examining how New Zealand should position themselves to maximize their leverage and 
influence the subsequent international trade negotiations with the EU and future trade negotiations 
with the UK.  
 
1.3 Research aim and objectives  
 
My interest in this topic arose through seeking to understand what the key opportunities and risks are 
to New Zealand’s agriculture sector post-Brexit. Brexit was initiated by the UK, a traditional and 
significant trade partner of New Zealand. Originally my thesis was limited to the bilateral relationship 
between these two parties as initial commentary suggested Brexit might merely be a period of critical 
disruption to the international political economy (Barber, 2016; Brinded, 2016). However, in the 
months that followed, Brexit has been reinterpreted as a vital trade negotiation opportunity for New 
Zealand. Brexit has opened up new trade opportunities, not only restricted to the UK, but also  
including the EU (MFAT, 2018b; Patterson, 2018b). Through the process of conducting interviews 
with key political and economic actors in international agriculture trade, specifically with a background 
in New Zealand, UK and EU agriculture trade policy, and analysing the key themes which have 
emerged, this thesis evolved to focus on understanding the challenges of achieving an adaptive and 
flexible New Zealand trade policy in response to the tensions that have erupted due to the ‘divorce’ of 
the UK and the EU.  
 
While New Zealand does not want to take advantage of Brexit or the situation that the UK and EU 
have found themselves in, New Zealand does not want to be adversely affected by Brexit either 
(Honey, 2017; Nine, 2018; One, 2017; Seven, 2017; Two, 2017). Therefore, negotiating favourable 





Using a case study approach which includes interviews, this thesis explores the short and long term 
diplomatic and trade risks and opportunities for New Zealand’s agriculture sector providing insights 
into the complexities of the Brexit negotiations and their potential outcomes. It also critically examines 
how New Zealand ought to position itself to maximize leverage and influence the future and 
subsequent international trade negotiations with the UK and EU that have resulted from Brexit. 
 
This thesis has four key objectives within the broad research aims above:  
 
1. To review the literature of small state trade and determine in what ways and to what extent we 
might expect global forces and larger economic and political powers to influence New 
Zealand.  
2. To interview key economic and political actors in international agriculture trade, specifically 
with a background in New Zealand, UK and EU agriculture trade policy, and document how 
New Zealand’s agriculture sector is responding to Brexit.  
3. To determine the threats and opportunities posed by Brexit for New Zealand agriculture trade. 
4. To discuss the implications of the research findings and identify opportunities for New 
Zealand to re-assess its relationship with the UK and EU around agriculture trade in beneficial 
ways. 
 
1.4 Methodology  
 
The research was conducted within the inquiry paradigm of qualitative research methods using a 
case study to design the research (Yin, 2009). The data was collected through semi-structured 
interviews with grey literature and mass media supplementing my understanding of the case. The 
interviewing method is discussed along with the ethical considerations at 1.4.2. The theory behind the 
research is important to understand and consider as it provides a “framework within which social 
phenomena can be understood and the research findings can be interpreted” (Bryman, 2012, p. 20).   
 
1.4.1 Research approach  
 
The objective of qualitative research is to “understand the event, circumstance or phenomenon under 
study” (McNabb, 2004, p. 341). In qualitative research, non-statistical investigation techniques are 
employed to gather data that allows the researcher to intimately understand the phenomena studied 
(Bryman, 2012). This allows researchers to access people’s perceptions and understandings of 
events and their environment (Bryman, 2016). Austin (2014) notes that perceptions that are 
established through qualitative research are important help deepen understanding of the issue. 
Therefore the researchers’ job is to capture people’s perceptions and interpret or analyse the findings 




qualitative research involve two central tenets: ‘(1) face-to-face interaction is the fullest condition of 
participating in the mind of another human being, and (2) you must participate in the mind of another 
human being (in sociological terms’ “take the role of the other”) to acquire social knowledge’ ((Lofland 
and Lofland 1995:16) cited by Bryman (2012:399)). Qualitative research allows the researcher to 
analyse and comprehend what is actually happening in naturally occurring settings and to understand 
experiences from a variety of viewpoints (Silverman, 2006).  
 
This research involves a case study within a qualitative methodological paradigm. A case study is a 
detailed and intensive analysis of a single phenomenon, with the researcher concerned solely with 
the complexity and particular nature of the case in question (Bryman, 2016, p. 66). Robert Yin’s case 
study method, first outlined and published in his 1984 book Case Study Research, was used to 
establish the parameters of data collection and analysis. Yin (2009) distinguishes five different types 
of case studies made by writers, including the critical case, the extreme or unique case, the 
representative or typical case, the revelatory case and the longitudinal case (Bryman, 2012, p. 70). 
As established by Yin, case studies are the “preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are 
being posed, when the investigator has little control over events and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2009, p. 1). 
 
Bearing the insights of Austin, Bryman and Yin in mind, I was conscious that Brexit is a contemporary 
phenomenon, of which I had no control over and there was currently little published peer reviewed 
secondary literature on Brexit. The research occurred at a single point in time, as in the context of 
this study Brexit could be described as an extreme or unique “case” that holds an intrinsic 
interest(Bryman, 2012, p. 70). Many people are following the potential impacts Brexit may have on 
the international political economy. Therefore, qualitative research would enhance understanding of 
Brexit through a detailed and intensive analysis of the case from the perspective of New Zealand’s 
trade policymakers and advisors.   
 
While I am not involved in Brexit negotiations, through a Parliamentary and Business scholarship I 
was able to travel to the UK and interview key political and economic actors from amongst New 
Zealand’s trade policy “elite”. All fifteen of the interviewees had an intimate understanding of 
international agriculture trade policy and were actively engaged in assessing the impact of Brexit on 
the international political economy. Nine out of fifteen informants had a specific interest of how Brexit 
would impact New Zealand. Therefore, through qualitative research I could gain a deep 
comprehension of the complexities of Brexit negotiations and New Zealand’s adaptive trade policy 






1.4.2 Data Gathering Method 
 
This section details the sampling strategies used to recruit respondents, provides an overview of the 
characteristics of respondents and outlines the procedures used for interviews. Interviewing was 
conducted with Human Ethics approval from University of Canterbury, to ensure confidentiality and 
ethical treatment of data in collection and analysis. Ethics approval was gained on the 18th of 
October 2017 under low risk requirements, from the University of Canterbury, Human Ethics 
Committee (HEC), reference number HEC 2017/88/LR (Appendix 1). The research project is low-risk 
as there was no risk of deception, threat, invasion of privacy, mental, physical or cultural risk or stress 
and did not involve gathering personal information of a sensitive nature about or from individuals. 
Appendix 2 contains the form sent to the respondents summarising the research project (as it was in 
October 2017) and Appendix 3 contains the consent form.  
 
Due to the politically sensitive nature of the results and Brexit remaining a fluid situation, it was 
decided that the respondents would remain anonymous, as was provided for in the consent forms.  
 
1.4.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews  
 
Data collection began mid-2017 and concluded mid-2018 and involved semi-structured interviews 
with ten economic and political respondents drawn from the policy community in New Zealand, and 
five from various parts of Europe. Most of these respondents are New Zealanders, as the case study 
is more concerned with how New Zealand is responding and positioning itself post-Brexit. Snowball 
referral was adopted to reach as many of these respondents as possible as “networks of individuals 
are the focus of attention” (Bryman, 2012, p. 63) due to their inside knowledge of the phenomena. 
Gaining access into the international trade world can be difficult and one often needs an introduction 
in order to gain access. However, during interviews, respondents would offer to contact their 
colleagues without prompting. Through these introductions I was able to collect and correlate a large 
amount of qualitative data.  
 
Semi-structured interviewing was chosen as the primary method for data collection as Bryman (2012) 
argues that “conversational interview style makes the study more ecologically valid than research 
using more formal instruments of data collection” (Bryman, 2012, p. 63). Using semi-structured 
interviews opposed to structured interviews or focus groups gave me an insight into what the 
respondent “sees as relevant and important” (Bryman, 2012, p. 63). Nine questions were asked to 
determine how respondents perceived New Zealand’s agriculture sector was responding to Brexit. At 
Appendix 4 these questions are outlined in full. Asking a general, but flexible, set of questions, and 




and rich answers that reflected a variety of viewpoints (Bryman, 2012, p. 63). All respondents were 
encouraged to expand further on their answers (Bryman, 2016). The interviewing was not intrusive; 
those who agreed to take part in the study were asked eight to nine questions which took 30 to 60 
minutes. 
 
I was concerned with validity such as respondent validation and triangulation (discussed below at 
1.4.3.1) that was conducive to this case study. Interviews continued until no new information was 
being shed on the topics, all answers were written down during the interview and transcribed 
immediately after the interview had ended. The transcript was then sent to the respondents for their 
approval before being returned to me with minor adjustments or corrections.  
 
1.4.3 Validity of the Interview Sample 
 
As previously explained, the final sample of respondents interviewed were political and economic 
actors with an interest in international agriculture trade policy. Fifteen interviews were conducted; ten 
were with New Zealanders and the remaining five respondents identified as British. Many of the 
British respondents and a few New Zealanders have close ties to the EU. Six respondents work in 
government, two work in business, four work in government and business and the final three work in 
academia. Interviews continued until no new insights other than minor reflection, were being gained. 
 
Figure 3. Summary of Respondents Nationality and Employment Sector 
Respondent Nationality Employer/Sector 
Respondent One New Zealander/ 
European 
Government  
Respondent Two New Zealander Government and Business 
Respondent 
Three 
British/ European Government and Academia 
Respondent Four British Government and Academia 
Respondent Five New Zealander Business 
Respondent Six British Business 
Respondent 
Seven 
New Zealander Government 
Respondent Eight British/ European Academia and Government 
Respondent Nine New Zealander Government and Business 
Respondent Ten New Zealander Business 
Respondent 
Eleven 














New Zealander Business  
Respondent 
Fifteen 
New Zealander Government and Business 
Source: Author 
 
1.4.4 Limitations of Research Method 
 
There are some criticisms of a case study within the paradigm of qualitative research that must be 
considered. For example, how well a case study fares against the criteria of reliability, replication and 
validity, which are used for the evaluation of social research (Bryman, 2016, p. 46). In the case of 
qualitative research, “concerns about external validity and the ability to generalise do not loom as 
large” (Bryman, 2012, p. 203), as they do in quantitative research. Qualitative researchers can still 
employ the terms of reliability and validity, in a similar fashion to quantitative researchers through 
adjusting the meanings to suit qualitative research. There are also alternative criteria which 
qualitative researchers argue should be used in such cases; trustworthiness and authenticity 
(Bryman, 2012). In this instance, internal validity that flows from quantitative research was used, and 
respondent validation and triangulation from the alternative criteria of credibility was used.  
 
In order to make sure that there was internal validity, whereby there has been a good match between 
the researcher observations and the theoretical ideas developed, respondent validation and 
triangulation was employed (Bryman, 2012). Respondent validation adds to the trustworthiness of the 
research as the researcher must have their understanding corroborated by the person interviewed. If 
the researchers and the respondents understanding matches and is found to be acceptable by the 
respondent, credibility of the results is achieved. In this research, I sent the transcripts back to the 
respondents in order to receive confirmation that what had been discussed during interviews had 
been correctly understood. This increases validity as it contributes to greater confidence, on behalf of 
the researcher, in the findings (Bryman, 2012). The results were also compared with other grey 
literature and media reports.  
 
To further validate research findings, and demonstrate robustness of research, triangulation was also 
adopted alongside respondent validation. Triangulation refers “to the use of multiple methods or data 
sources in qualitative research to develop a comprehensive understanding of phenomena” (Carter, 




including method triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, and data source 
triangulation. In this case method triangulation was employed because method triangulation involves 
the use of use of multiple methods of data collection about the same phenomenon and may include 
interviews, observation and field notes (Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso, Blythe, & Neville, 2014, p. 
545). Validity is achieved through method triangulation as it allows for findings to be cross-checked 
(Bryman, 2012). In this study, multiple data sources were collected and then triangulated by 
comparing interviews with respondents that provide unique “insider” perspective and understanding 
of how Brexit may affect New Zealand agriculture. As was mentioned above in 1.4.2.1 interviewing 
continued only until no new insights were provided and I was able to cross-check the findings across 
the multiple data sources.  
 
1.4.5 Methodology Conclusion  
 
As stated in 1.3, the aim of this thesis is to explore the short and long term diplomatic and trade risks 
and opportunities for New Zealand’s agriculture sector through providing provide insights into the 
complexities of the Brexit negotiations and their potential outcomes. It also critically examines how 
New Zealand ought to position itself to maximize leverage and influence the future and subsequent 
international trade negotiations with the UK and EU that have resulted from Brexit. In 1.4, I detail and 
justify why this case study was conducted through the paradigm of qualitative research, specifically 
the semi-structured interviews with fifteen political and economic respondents. I argue that due to the 
contemporary nature of Brexit and its status as a unique phenomenon, research was required that 
explores a specific point and place in time by drawing on respondents’ perspectives. The data 
analysis of the respondent’s perspectives occurs in Chapter 4 and the implications from the data in 
Chapter 5. The respondents offer a targeted perspective on Brexit and drawing from the themes 
present in the interviews, possible policy options for an adaptive trade policy employed by New 
Zealand that may minimise the impacts of Brexit on New Zealand’s agriculture sector.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure  
 
This thesis progresses in six chapters. In Chapter 2, I critically review theories pertaining to small 
states and how they react when there is a change in the international political economy (Katzenstein, 
1985; Keating, 2016; Lynch, 2013). I also examine how negotiators from small states can maximize 
their leverage and influence in international asymmetric negotiations (Finny, 2018; Hoadley, 2017; 
Jones & Commonwealth, 2013). Finally, I discuss how anticipatory governance is vital for small 
states to manage phenomena (Boston, 2018). These theories discuss the intricacies of being a small 
state in today’s modern world, and how a small state should strive towards using their nature as an 





Chapter 3 presents a history of New Zealand’s agriculture trade. New Zealand’s colonial past with the 
UK and New Zealand’s subsequent relationship with the EU is explored (Saunders, 2016). A review 
of CAP, how it came into being and what the implications are in the broader international political 
economy is explained (Markovic, Njegovan, & Pejanovic, 2012). I also go into detail about how New 
Zealand re-orientated itself after the UK joined the EEC and what New Zealand did to become an 
internationally competitive exporter of agriculture goods (Gibbons, 2008; Keating, 2016; McNeill, 
2016). In conclusion, this chapter briefly details why Brexit happened and what has occurred in the 
international political economy immediately thereafter (Caporale, Gil-Alana, & Trani, 2018; Ronald 
Inglehart & P Norris, 2016; Shipman, 2016). Ultimately, reviewing the history of New Zealand’s 
agriculture trade contextualizes current relations and gives a deeper understanding of why Brexit 
should be studied in conjunction with New Zealand’s agriculture trade sector. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 form the body of this thesis that seeks to understanding the challenges of 
responding to the tensions that have erupted due to the ‘divorce’ of the UK and the EU through an 
adaptive and flexible New Zealand trade policy. Chapter four examines findings from key 
respondents and breaks them down into key themes. The key themes of uncertainty, New Zealand’s 
relationships with the UK and the EU and potential impacts explain the short and long term diplomatic 
and trade risks and opportunities for New Zealand’s agriculture sector. Through providing insights 
into the complexities of the Brexit negotiations and their potential outcomes, Chapter Five critically 
examines how New Zealand ought to position itself to maximize leverage and influence the future 
and subsequent international trade negotiations with the UK and EU that have resulted from Brexit.  
 
In Chapter 6, I conclude the thesis by summarizing the research analysis and responding to the 
research aim. I also offer potential avenues of research and argue that greater attention should be 
paid to New Zealand’s trade policy due to its impact on New Zealand society. Finally, I conclude that 




This introductory chapter opened by arguing that by the UK initiating the process of Brexit, there is 
now a significant trade opportunity with both the UK and the EU via FTA’s. If this process is managed 
appropriately, New Zealand will be able to mitigate the effects of Brexit on New Zealand’s agriculture 
sector.  I outlined the research aim of exploring what the short and long term risks and opportunities 
are to New Zealand’s agriculture sector and what New Zealand needs to do to position themselves to 
maximize their leverage and influence the subsequent international trade negotiations that have 
resulted from Brexit disrupting the international political economy. I defined the research objectives 




case study. In the next chapter, I consider the theories that pertain to small states and how they react 







Chapter Two: Agriculture Trade Policy; Understanding Issues for 
Small States 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter critically reviews theories pertaining to small states. Firstly, how small states react when 
there is a change in the international political economy is discussed (Katzenstein, 1985; Keating, 
2016; Lynch, 2013). This is accomplished in conjunction with examining how small states can 
maximize their leverage and influence in international asymmetric negotiations (Finny, 2018; 
Hoadley, 2017; Jones & Commonwealth, 2013). Finally, anticipatory governance is discussed, an 
emerging theory of policy-making that is vital for small states to manage unexpected events in the 
international political economy (Boston, 2018). These theories discuss the intricacies of being a small 
state in today’s modern world, and how a small state could strive towards using their nature as an 
asset rather than a hindrance when reacting to global forces and the subsequent opportunities that 
may present. 
 
2.2 What is a Small State? 
 
The state is considered to be the most central concept in the study of politics, and yet the definition of 
a small state remains elusive (Burnham, 2009). Fauriol, East, Vital, Von Daniken and Hendersen 
have discussed three common variables; population, geography and GDP as factors determining 
whether a state is ‘small’ (Thornton, 2006, p. 14). Military strength is another variable other scholars 
have suggested, along with level of industrialisation and energy efficiency (Sam, 2015, p. 4). 
Katzenstein (1985), finds a small state is one that is vulnerable to global forces over which ‘small’ 
states have no control over (Katzenstein, 1985).  
 
Sutton (2011, p.141) argues that the definition and framework advanced by the institutions of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the World Bank is the most satisfactory. These institutions formed a 
working group and developed three areas to be used when one is looking to determine whether to 
label a state small. They first established a working definition of a “small state as having a population 
threshold of less than 1.5 million” (Sutton, 2011, p. 147). However, the institutions also added a 
caveat on the definition stating that “no definition, whether it be population, geographical size or GDP, 
is likely to be fully satisfactory. In practice there is a continuum, with states larger than whatever 
threshold is chosen sharing some or all of the characteristics of small countries” (Sutton, 2011, p. 
147). Secondly, they found economic vulnerability is a key variable of small states, when compared 
to large states (Sutton, 2011, p. 147). Finally, the working group found that the main problem for 
small states is the impact of globalization and the fear of marginalisation in the international political 





However, Sutton and Payne (1993) believe the concept of smallness is relative, therefore the size of 
a state “will continually undergo revision according to the configuration of the international system at 
the time and the particular characteristics of the small state which are being examined” (Sutton, 2011, 
p. 147). What can be said is that the only consistent conclusion that academics have reached is that 
there is ‘more fragmentation, than consensus’ (Long, 2017, p. 1).  
 
Traditionally, New Zealand has been thought of as a small state (Sam, 2015, pp. 407-420) and per 
the Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank and Katzenstein, New Zealand is economically 
vulnerable, and does not have control over global forces. New Zealand’s perception of themselves is 
that of a small and trade-dependent nation (Köllner, 2018, p. 442). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MFAT) website states “New Zealand is a small country with an economy that is highly 
dependent on trade. New Zealand’s share of world trade has held steady at around 0.36% since 
1990” (MFAT, 2018f). By focusing on perception, the strict (and often conflicting) parameters of the 
small state definition are eliminated. According to Hey, a state only need to be considered small by 
the states citizens and institutions of that country, or another country, to fulfil that capacity (Hey, 
2003, p. 3). 
 
Henrikson (2001), suggests combining the objective criteria of population size and the subjective 
criteria of perception as a way to define a state. According to Henrikson, a state must be quantifiably 
small but must also ‘feel’ and ‘act’ small (Henrikson, 2001, pp. 61-62). Vital (1971) offers another 
contrasting but complementary viewpoint by suggesting a state is ‘small’ depending on the position it 
inhabits within the international system (Vital, 1971, p. 9). Therefore, when one compares two states 
that are interacting, whether a state is small or not becomes apparent due to the power imbalance.  
 
2.3 Small State Responses to the International Political Economy 
 
The traditional stereotype of the small state is that of a helpless pawn on the international stage due 
to their limited political and economic power (Fox, 1959). Small states are typically portrayed as being 
economically vulnerable as their size is considered the determinant of their wealth (Ingebritsen, 2006, 
p. 11). According to Briguglio, the economic characteristics of small states are high economic 
openness, high degree of export concentration and high dependence on strategic imports (Briguglio, 
2014, p. 3). These characteristics result from small domestic markets and economic size plus a lack 
of natural resources (Briguglio, 2014, p. 3).  
 
Small states are also unable to plan for long-term sectoral changes due to their economic openness 
and are therefore at the mercy of the international markets and any disruptions that may occur 




export markets (Tonurist, 2010, pp. 8-29). Being unable to exercise control over the condition or 
regulation of international political economic markets, coupled with heavy reliance on them to 
maintain a living standard for their citizens, exposes small states to global shocks. Ultimately, 
economic theory assumes that small states are vulnerable to the international political economy.   
Handel (1981), asserts that although small states are generally more economically vulnerable than 
larger states, they are never entirely defenceless (Handel, 1981, p. 301). For example, according to 
Baldacchino, being ‘open’ can actually be used as a source of strength if utilised appropriately, as it 
encourages small states to be internationally competitive in the world markets (Baldacchino & 
Bertram, 2009, p. 147). In addition, while the larger more powerful states are the main actors on the 
world stage, small states are not peripheral. Small states are flexible and can manoeuvre quickly 
when confronted with tension and changes in spheres of influence in the international political 
economy, a derivative power that enables them to obtain, commit and manipulate the power of more 
powerful states (Handel, 1981, p. 301).  
Small states also choose a variety of economic and social policies to remain adaptable (Katzenstein, 
1985). Katzenstein theorizes that when a small state is exposed to the pressures of global forces 
over which they have no control, they adapted to the change by relying on different variants of 
democratic corporatism (Ingebritsen, 2010, p. 26). Using the strategies of international liberalization 
and domestic compensation, these small states have managed to respond to adverse economic 
change (Ingebritsen, 2006, p. 26). These strategies include having a “homogeneous population, 
closely integrated systems and flexibility in political and economic organization” (Ingebritsen, 2010, p. 
315). Small states are capable of rapid change and are able to develop policy and have a resolve 
that cuts across political party lines when confronted with global forces, something inherent to their 
nature (Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009, p. 143).  
Despite confronting many of the same economic pressures other small states encounter, New 
Zealand has not maintained the same model of corporatism as its European counterparts (Arsenault, 
2017, p. 164). New Zealand adopted the market competition economy during the 1980’s to reduce 
their vulnerability to the global economy (Keating, 2016, pp. 3-41; McNeill, 2016, p. 171). The market 
competition model (or market liberal) is a mode of adaption that embraces global competition and 
reduces the state to policy-takers of the international community (Keating, 2016, p. 9). Ultimately it 
requires that the state accept international economic cycles and the subsequent rise and fall of 
incomes.  
 
However, New Zealand’s political system does exhibit key fundamentals of the corporate states that 
Katzenstein’s initially analysed, particularly the emphasis on pragmatism and consensus 
(Baldersheim, 2016, p. 229). Despite abandoning some of the harsher market neoliberal policies, 




set out in the 1980’s. Changes in government “do not lead to abrupt changes of policy or institutions - 
continuity is the name of the game” (Baldersheim, 2016, p. 230).  
 
2.4 The reality of being small and distant  
 
Adopting domestic social and economic modes of adaption is only one approach utilized by small 
states to avoid the worst impacts of global forces. Small states “tend to possess a trade focus in 
foreign affairs” as this enables them to accomplish their own goals (Thornton, 2006, p. 22). Small 
states struggle to be heard and have their interests taken into account by the wider international 
community if they have not been endowed with a vast quantity of natural resources or are not seen 
as strategic (Lynch, 2013).  
The soft power a small state possesses can help to alleviate alienation on the global scene through 
gaining influence and leadership in specific areas. To achieve influence and leadership status, small 
states must have an ability to impress “when there is no scope to impose, to earn respect regardless 
of limited resources and to illuminate lesser known paths that others large and small might usefully 
explore” (Lynch, 2013, p. 20). According to Lynch, a former diplomat, the traits nations display are no 
different to the standards of good conduct in personal or professional life that encourages others to 
hold someone in high regard, or not (Lynch, 2013, p. 20). Small states also engage in international 
organizations and draw on international laws and norms to enhance their leverage and independence 
in the world system (Hey, 2003, p. 303).  
 
Lodge (1982) discusses the importance of soft power in international politics and how it can impact 
trade relations. Soft power is typically defined as the “power to influence the environment of 
international affairs through such intangible factors as culture, values and ideas. Soft power is less 
direct than hard power but sometimes more effective” (Balaam & Dillman, 2011).  It was found that 
New Zealand’s abilities in diplomacy, their ties to the UK and approach to the rest of Europe were 
what helped New Zealand to secure special access for its dairy products and maintain New Zealand 
interests in the European Union (Lodge, 1982). Lodge recommends that in order to be successful in 
negotiating economic access into larger markets, small states have to involve politics to gain 
bargaining power (Lodge). It was concluded that the soft power and diplomacy skills displayed by 
New Zealand’s diplomats and officials in the 1970’s contributed significantly to achieving the level of 
access awarded to New Zealand by the EU (Obadovic, 2018, p. 3).  
 
Similarly, Gibbons (2008) argues that New Zealand’s interests were only safeguarded due to 
historical close ties to Europe and sentiment by the British public and European politicians (Gibbons, 
2008). This was despite having extraordinarily different views on agriculture and trade (Gibbons, 
2008, p. 94). He ultimately argues that the links formed via ‘people to people’ and by diplomats are 




encourages cooperation, which in turn allows economic relationships to grow (Gibbons, 2008, p. 
117). Gibbons strongly states that New Zealand diplomats and officials have to work very hard to 
protect and promote New Zealand’s interests overseas (Gibbons, 2008, p. 94). This point has more 
salience when coupled with Lodge’s (1984) observation that frequently small states do not have the 
same level of access to resources as larger states, to maintain their presence internationally (Lodge, 
1982, p. ix). Frequently, small states will rely on allies for information, as they cannot afford to 
maintain embassies in every country (Lodge, 1982, p. x). 
2.5 Negotiating Against the Odds  
 
As established above, small states have tools in their arsenal to minimise disruptions from global 
forces. What is of interest is whether this logic follows into asymmetric relationships, with the most 
obvious example being in situations where a small state is negotiating a trade agreement with a large 
state or bloc. In that situation could a small state, such as New Zealand, which in comparison to the 
corporatist states that interested Katzenstein, is geographically remote and more liberal in economic 
orientation, negotiate a fair and equitable trade deal with a far larger party, such as the UK or the 
EU?  
 
International trade must be viewed as the result of ‘a history of political bargains among states of 
differing power capabilities’ (Bilal, Lombaerde, & Tussie, 2011, p. 1). These bargains have created a 
highly specific and asymmetric set of rules – with historical alliances continuing to sway trade (Bilal et 
al., 2011, p. 1). Layers of rules and regulations that are beneficial towards industrial countries and 
sectors are created by these bargains and can place a severe handicap on developing countries and 
sectors (Jones & Commonwealth, 2013, p. 1). It was hoped that the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
would correct the power balance. Unfortunately, consensus was lost due to competing interests and 
states continuing to align themselves with their natural partners (Bilal et al., 2011, pp. 1-2). 
 
Trade and its corresponding asymmetry are constantly in flux and therefore impacts the negotiation 
process of a trade agreement. Asymmetric trade negotiations are an awkward truth for New Zealand 
but a well-established fate. This is because small states have a greater dependence on the larger 
state’s markets (S. Hoadley, 2012, p. 8) (Bilal et al., 2011). However, whether small states are 
doomed to the ever-changing whims of larger states is a matter of debate. Jones (2013) argues in 
her guide “Negotiating against the odds: a guide for trade negotiators from developing countries” that 
‘the less powerful party in an international negotiation is not necessarily at the mercy of a more 
powerful party’ (Salacuse 2000, p.257). The guide sets out to answer the question “how can 
negotiators from small developing countries maximize their leverage and influence in international 
negotiations” (Jones & Commonwealth, 2013, p. 2). While Jones does acknowledge and outline how 




“experience shows us that a smaller party can augment its power through the skilful use of 
negotiating strategies and tactics” (Jones & Commonwealth, 2013, p. 63). Because negotiations in 
international trade are so important to small states, they have had to learn to adapt to global forces 
they have little to no control over and influence them in ways that large states do not.  
 
In 2014, Jones published a working paper titled, “When do weak states win?”. Here, Jones expands 
on her argument that small states are not as powerless in the international political economy as is 
first perceived. Here, she looks at 10 experiences of asymmetric trade negotiations, starting from the 
1960’s involving small developing nations from the ACP (Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific) and 
powerful European states (Jones, 2014). Starting with the classic assumption, that the more powerful 
state will achieve their objectives, Jones researched the 10 episodes of negotiations, but found that 
there was a disparity between the results and the assumption. In four of the ten negotiations, the 
powerful European state did not achieve all the outcomes that they set out to. Rather there was “a 
substantial and important gap between what European countries wanted and the final negotiated 
outcome” (Jones, 2014). In negotiation literature this is called “the structuralist dilemma” ((Zartman, 
1997) cited by Jones, 2014, p 3). Jones then asks how the larger party (in this case Europe) who 
objectively held all the power, failed to see all of their interests met in the aforementioned four 
negotiations (Jones, 2014).  
 
Through her research, she establishes that if three conditions are held constant, “small developing 
countries can exert substantial influence even in a profoundly asymmetric encounter” (Jones, 2014, 
p. 1). These conditions are: 
1. The small state must be able to walk away from the negotiation at no cost. 
2. Where the small state is considered to be highly strategic by the large state, it can use this as 
a source of leverage.  
3. The small state must have the political leadership and technical skills to deploy an astute 
negotiating strategy.  
 
If these conditions hold and small states accurately respond to the international relationship while 
employing an astute negotiation strategy, then small states can walk away from the negotiating table 
with their own demands met.  
 
Both Jones and Bilal offer ways in which small states can either prepare for asymmetric negotiations 
or manage the asymmetry. Part of Jones’ research for her guide was to gather information from 
negotiators from small developing countries through online surveys, in-depth interviews, focus-group 
discussions and detailed studies (Jones & Commonwealth, 2013, p. 3). From this correlated 




preparation, second to use moves away from the table, thirdly to cultivate political skills and finally 
that mindset matters (Jones & Commonwealth, 2013).  
 
Bilal offers four recommendations for developing countries to manage the asymmetry: form 
sympathetic inter-governmental coalitions (such as the G-22, G-3, G-7 and G-90); ally with non-state 
actors (international non-governmental organizations, civil society); shape international norms to 
favour the weak by encouraging new norms and forming a new consensus (or new ‘epistemic 
communities’); and finally, despite the circumstances of asymmetry, the weaker state must act (Bilal 
et al., 2011, p. 13). Another strategy that can be implemented is from the article, How the Weak Win 
Wars by Ivan Arreguín-Toft. While his discussion centres on armed conflict, the idea that larger states 
can underestimate small states, which allows small states to outmanoeuvre the larger states and ‘win 
the war’, can still be applied to trade negotiations (Arreguín-Toft, 2001).  
 
In his book, New Zealand Trade Negotiations, Stephen Hoadley reviews the last 50 years of New 
Zealand’s trade negotiations. Hoadley offers eight phases of trade negotiations, which he argues 
“simplifies the evolution of New Zealand’s often protracted and complex trade liberalization 
negotiations” (Hoadley, 2017, p. 5). Using the case studies of New Zealand negotiating trade access 
with the UK, United States, Japan and China, Hoadley demonstrates how negotiations develop and 
progress throughout the eight stages, as listed below (Hoadley, 2017): 
 
1. Problem diagnosis  




6. Ratification  
7. Implementation 
8. Adjustment  
 
Hoadley makes it very clear that the eight phases are not linear, as negotiations and relationships 
during these phases will often “overlap, move out of sequence, stall and repeat themselves” 
(Hoadley, 2017, p. 5). Hoadley concludes that a small state can exercise ‘issue’ power even though 
their negotiating partner has greater structural power (Hoadley, 2017, p. 8). This means New Zealand 
can be successful, or even outmanoeuvre, larger more powerful states in trade negotiations. But to 
do this, small states must be prepared, anticipates issues, uses any advantage and manipulates any 





2.6 Anticipatory Governance  
 
It is important to recognise that the future is full of uncertainties and risks, and that “major, 
unexpected and hard-to-predict events are inevitable” (Boston, 2018, p. 12). The obsession with 
certainty and clarity creates an environment encouraging inaction. As a result, the worst impacts that 
a government, business or individual imagines and wishes to avoid are realized and potential 
opportunities are squandered.  
 
Uncertainty does not have to be detrimental to a state’s potential. If explored, the uncertainty of the 
future or a situation can be an asset (Meadu, 2013). Anticipatory governance is defined as “a new 
model of decision making under high uncertainty based on concepts of foresight and flexibility that 
uses a wide range of possible futures to anticipate adaption strategies and then monitors changes 
and uses these strategies to guide decision making” (Quay, 2010, p. 496). Uncertainty is not 
something to be scared of; rather it helps governments, businesses, societies and individuals make 
decisions and creates various forms of adaption strategies (Meadu, 2013) (Vermeulen et al., 2013). 
But a state must have the political will to introduce anticipatory governance (IISD, 2007; Vermeulen et 
al., 2013, p. 8357). In order to protect a state’s future, governments must be robust, yet have flexible 
institutions and processes (Boston, 2018, p. 12). Resilience and interconnected dimensions are vital 
to achieving flexibility of governance, with the ultimate goal being to “embed the future in the present” 
(Boston, 2018, p. 12). According to Boston, sound anticipatory governance requires policymakers to 
identify, assess, manage and mitigate multiple risks, while also being legal, honest, legitimate, 
democratic effective, efficient, fair, accountable and much more (Boston, 2018, p. 15). 
 
As discussed above, New Zealand is vulnerable to economic uncertainties and risks, but is also 
vulnerable to the risk of “failing to give proper attention to readily detectable threats or fail to pay 
sufficient heed to major societal trends or emerging opportunities” (Boston, 2018, p. 14). According to 
Boston, many of “New Zealand governance arrangements, policy settings and regulatory frameworks 
are appropriately future-focused and suitably anticipatory” (Boston, 2018, p. 17) when looking at the 
resilience of the New Zealand economy. In his book Safeguarding the Future, Boston (2017) sets out 
to answer how to anticipate and safeguard the future when a state is confronted with populist 
movements, impatient voters, fake news and powerful vested interests. Boston acknowledges how 
impossible this seems due to the problematic nature of Brexit. While he offers solutions for 
sustainability, climate change and natural disasters, he does not offer any specific answers for 
economic earthquakes. However, Boston does suggest that a “high-level foresight unit in central 
government or requirements for all departments and major agencies to conduct regular foresight 
exercises, such as horizon scanning, the identification of creeping problems and the formulation of 




Ultimately, Boston argues that governance needs to move away from ‘presentist bias towards more 
considered, rational, long-term governance’ (Boston, 2017, p. 67). 
 
Whether New Zealand businesses are adequately prepared to take advantage of opportunities that 
present themselves during times of uncertainty is answered in part by Benson-Rea and Mikic (2005). 
They researched the business relationship between New Zealand and the EU and how New Zealand 
responds to challenges with specific reference to strategy and marketing issues (Obadovic, 2018, p. 
5). It was found that New Zealand businesses who operate within the EU struggle to address current 
opportunities and new opportunities that may present themselves (Luciano & Mayes, 2005).  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has contextualized the issue of agricultural trade policy for New Zealand in a post-Brexit 
world by reviewing the literatures on small states in the international political economy, asymmetric 
negotiations, and anticipatory governance. These theories discuss the intricacies of being a small 
state in today’s modern world, and how a small state could strive towards using their nature as an 
asset rather than a hindrance. Taken together, these three approaches suggest small states are able 
to adapt to adverse disruption in the international political economy through their inherent flexibility 
and seize upon opportunities that may present. In addition, they provide a framework for thinking 
about how New Zealand may strategically position itself to leverage the larger states of the UK and 
EU so that the worst impacts of Brexit are anticipated and mitigated. In the next chapter, New 







Chapter Three: Understanding New Zealand’s Agriculture Trade 




The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine New Zealand’s international agriculture trade 
history. The chapter consists of two main sections. Firstly, the political and trade relationship between 
New Zealand, the UK and the EU is historically explored from New Zealand’s perspective to 
contextualise the current relationship. Secondly, a brief overview of Brexit is offered, so that the 
uncertainty and tensions that New Zealand is operating within are fully understood.  
 
3.2 The Colony of New Zealand 
 
In 1840, New Zealand became a colony of the UK when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed (McIntyre, 
2012). The UK’s commitment to free trade and to colonial New Zealand allowed special access into 
the UK’s market (Saunders, 2016, p. 44). This encouraged exports to become concentrated; by the 
1890’s, the UK was acquiring two-thirds of New Zealand’s exports including non-perishable sheep 
products, native timber and gold (McKinnon, 2010) (McIntyre, 2012). While the trade relationship 
between the two states ebbed and flowed, it was not until 1954 that the trade relationship began to 
significantly dissipate (Saunders, 2016). From 1954 to 1984, the UK’s share of New Zealand’s 
merchandise trade fell from over 60% to just above 25% (Saunders, 2016, pp. 3-4). This left New 
Zealand economically vulnerable due to their dependence on the UK (Woodfield, 2008, p. 9). As the 
UK moved into Europe’s orbit and began to flirt with the idea of becoming part of the European 
Economic Community (EEC), it was recognized that New Zealand would have to seek out other 
markets (Saunders, 2016, pp. 3-4).  
 
The EEC is the predecessor to the EU and was formed in 1957 at the signing of the Treaty of Rome 
(Woodfield, 2008, p. 13). Since its formation, the EEC (and later the EU) have caused problems for 
New Zealand’s agriculture sector, due to the market disrupting policy of the Common Agriculture 
Policy (CAP). CAP is a protectionist policy that excludes all outside producers from the European 
market and distorts the international market of agriculture (Nixon & Yeabsley, 2010b). Article 39, (the 
‘farm income objective’) of the Treaty of Rome sets out the aims and principles of CAP (Ockenden, 
Franklin, & Royal Institute of International, 1995, p. 3). The initial goals were to: 
 
1. Raise the productivity based on implementation of technical progress and development of 
agricultural production based on optimum use of all production factors. 
2. Ensure fair standard of living for all farmers. 




4. Secure prices of agricultural food products acceptable to the consumers (Ockenden et al., 
1995, p. 3).  
 
In 1962, the EEC implemented a further three principles - market unity, financial solidarity and 
community preference - in an attempt to strengthen the agriculture sector even further (Hill & Ebooks, 
2012, p. 43). The implementation of this system guaranteed prices and offered import protection and 
market intervention (Markovic et al., 2012, p. 485).  
In 1961, the UK applied to enter into the EEC - but on the condition that they would not join unless 
New Zealand’s vital interests were protected (Woodfield, 2008, pp. 13-15). President de Gaulle of 
France refused access to the UK but in 1971, on their fifth attempt, the UK reached an agreement 
with the EEC (Woodfield, 2008, p. 15). New Zealand received preferential access for its dairy goods 
under Protocol 18 of the Treaty of Accession of the UK, where over five years, butter and cheese 
exports to the UK were too slowly decline (Obadovic, 2018, p. 20). Sheep meat exports were to have 
a preferential quota introduced at a later date (Obadovic, 2018, p. 20). New Zealand was the only 
developed country that was granted this special treatment and received the largest country-specific 
quotas among all other nations taking part in the negotiation process at this time (Gibbons, 2008; 
Lodge, 1982; Obadovic, 2018). New Zealand’s trade and political relationship with the EU is a direct 
consequence of the UK interceding on New Zealand’s behalf when the UK joined the EEC. New 
Zealand was able to secure its interests through gaining market access into the EEC’s agriculture 
market and establish important links in Brussels due to the special relationship New Zealand shared 
with the UK.   
However, the UK’s accession to the EEC still had huge corresponding economic impacts on New 
Zealand. The UK’s decision to re-orientate towards Europe, and away from its former colonies, 
makes it one of the most important events in New Zealand’s history (Robson & European Economic, 
1972). New Zealand had to fight for its life during the 1970s to secure market access in Europe and 
around the world. Learning how to negotiate and strategize against stronger parties was vital to 
survival, as was adapting a new internal and economic mode of survival (Robson & European 
Economic, 1972) (Hoadley, 2017). This event was the beginning of New Zealand’s transformation 
into a liberal market state, with an outward looking view of the world that had a strong focus on 
foreign affairs and trade, from a small colony in the South Pacific (Thornton, 2006).  
 
3.3 A Market Competition Economy  
 
These changes in the international political economy contributed to New Zealand’s internal economic 
and trade policy transformation. Robert Muldoon’s National Government had mismanaged the 




Zealand in huge economic trouble (Gustafon, 2011). In 1979, New Zealand’s agriculture subsidies 
had been at 15% of farm output value (Smith & Montgomery, 2004, p. 107), but the EEC could 
dictate the world prices of livestock due to their CAP subsidy regime (Nixon & Yeabsley, 2010a). 
Every time the EEC increased subsidies, world prices fell by the same amount (Nixon & Yeabsley, 
2010a). New Zealand faced depressed prices and uneconomic competition (Nixon & Yeabsley, 
2010a). In response to the unfavourable international market and losing their traditional trading 
partner, New Zealand’s agriculture subsidies rose to 33% of farm output value at the start of 1984 
(Smith & Montgomery, 2004, p. 107). Ultimately, the National Government provided approximately 
40% of sheep and beef farm income through subsidies (Smith & Montgomery, 2004, p. 108) with the 
cost of financial assistance and subsidies to the agriculture sector amounting to around $5 billion 
over the period from 1981-1986 (Johnston & Gerald, 1991, p. 134). 
 
In 1984, the Labour party came to power with David Lange as the new Prime Minister, with promises 
of major reforms to New Zealand’s economy (McLean, 2017). The Labour government completely 
overhauled New Zealand’s economy through the removal of regulations, subsidies, privatized state 
assets and devaluing the New Zealand dollar (Aimer, 2001). The aim of the reforms was to create a 
market-driven, competitive economy for all of New Zealand’s sectors and to create a level playing 
field (MPI, 2017).  
 
Some of the biggest subsidy cuts were to New Zealand’s agriculture sector (Smith & Montgomery, 
2004). New Zealand farms were now to act and be treated like any other business by being 
economically sustainable without any help from the Government (MPI, 2017). Within a year all 
production subsidies, tax concessions and concessionary interest rates had been removed as well as 
funding for drought relief, floods and other national weather disasters (Smith & Montgomery, 2004, p. 
107) (Nightingale, 2008). By the 1990’s the farming sector was one of the most deregulated sectors 
in the economy and by 2003 agriculture subsidies were less than 2%, with most of this being spent 
on agricultural research (Smith & Montgomery, 2004, p. 107) (Nightingale, 2008).  
 
The 1980’s were extraordinarily difficult for the agriculture community, with major financial hardship 
due to low incomes, loss in land value and increased debt (Johnston & Gerald, 1991, pp. 140-141). 
Yet, the anticipated shift of thousands of people off farms did not result (Smith & Montgomery, 2004, 
p. 108). New Zealand society and farmers adapted and while there were environmental and social 
costs, only 800 farmers faced forced sales, rather than the projected 8000 (Smith & Montgomery, 
2004, p. 108).  
 
The commitment to remove all government distortions was achieved and by the 1990’s it became 




New Zealand’s agriculture sector, particularly the dairy sector, was now internationally competitive 
and had gained a comparative advantage in agriculture (S. Hoadley, 2012, p. 37).   
 
In conjunction with an overhaul of the agriculture sector, the 1984 Labour Government reversed 
National’s protectionist stance, set a timetable for ending import licensing and reducing tariffs and 
encouraged free trade (Nixon & Yeabsley, 2010c). Due to a lack of success in multilateral trade 
agreements, New Zealand favours bilateral trade agreements. By utilizing bilateral trade policy, New 
Zealand has had more success in eliminating trade barriers, facilitating free trade and providing 
access for its exports with their allies and trading partners (Obadovic, 2018, p. 1). New Zealand 
expanded its markets in the USA, Japan, Soviet Union (Nixon & Yeabsley, 2010a). New Zealand also 
signed the Closer Economic Relations (CER) with Australia in 1983 (MFAT). 
 
Throughout the 2000’s, New Zealand focused on Asian markets and countries who were part of Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). New Zealand are extremely proficient and accomplished in 
negotiating FTAs with other asymmetrical countries. New Zealand was the first developed nation to 
conclude an FTA with China, the second largest economy and most populous country in the world. 
Not only did New Zealand conclude an agreement with a state where there is a huge asymmetric 
power imbalance, but the resulting FTA is still beneficial for New Zealand. In 2018, New Zealand has 
bilateral agreements with Singapore, Thailand, China, Malaysia, and South Korea (Obadovic, 2018; 
Woodfield, 2008, pp. 153-167). However, despite successfully establishing secure markets for their 
exports, New Zealand has been unable to gain further access into the EU.  
 
3.4 The Current Trade and Political Relationship between the EU and New Zealand  
 
Despite the main focus of the relationship being on trade and other economic matters, New Zealand 
and the EU have a strong relationship (Köllner, 2018, p. 444). Over the past two decades, New 
Zealand and the EU have signed 15 bilateral treaty-level agreements governing their political and 
economic relationship (Köllner, 2018, p. 444). The two parties have agreements on climate 
protection, corruption, transnational organized crime, human rights, science and technology. The 
official rhetoric on the cooperation between the two parties is that “The EU and New Zealand are like-
minded partners who share many common values and interests and see eye-to-eye on key 
international and global issues” ((EEAS, n.d) cited by Kollner, 2018 p.446).  
 
The current trade relationship between New Zealand and the EU is governed by the most-favoured-
nation (MFN) principle established in the WTO Uruguay Round (Obadovic, 2018, p. 34). New 
Zealand is one of only six WTO nations to not have a preferential access arrangement with the EU, 




Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) (Köllner, 2018, p. 447). New Zealand is able to export beef, sheep meat and 
dairy under the TRQ system to the EU at a significantly reduced tariff level. Currently the New 
Zealand beef sector is able to export 1,300 tonnes (product weight) of high-quality beef and may 
compete to supply 63,703 tonnes of frozen beef and 53,000 tonnes of frozen meat of bovine animals 
(116,703 total) for processing to the EU annually. Imports within the TRQ”) are referred to as “in-
quota” and attract a 20% ad valorem duty (NZMeatBoard, 2016a).  
 
During the Uruguay Round, New Zealand succeeded in obtaining the largest country-specific quota 
of sheep meat and goat meat (carcass weight equivalent) among all the other nations who were 
negotiating with the EU at this time (Obadovic, 2018, p. 51). In 2008, the quota was increased to 
228,254 tonnes and may be exported to the EU annually at zero duty (NZMeatBoard, 2016b). If the 
amount was to go over the allowed weight, the out-of-quota tariff rate is 12.8% plus the fixed amount 
in the range of €90.2 to €311.8 per 100 kilograms per net (Obadovic, 2018, p. 51).  
 
New Zealand’s specific butter quota was granted when the UK joined the EEC in 1973 (Obadovic, 
2018, p. 51). The current annual volume for specific butter quota is 74,693 metric tonnes while the in-
quota tariff is €70 per 100 kilograms. There are two country-specific TRQs for New Zealand cheese. 
The quota for cheese for processing is 4,000 tonnes and for whole cheddar cheeses it is 7,000 
tonnes, making a total combined volume of 11,000 metric tonnes per year, with an in-quota tariff rate 
of €17.06 per 100 kilograms for both (Obadovic, 2018, p. 51). Both butter and cheese have to fall 
within the specific description mandated by the EU.  
 
Despite New Zealand having some difficulty accessing the EU’s market, the EU is still New Zealand’s 
third largest trading partner. The latest trade figures show New Zealand imports from the EU totalling 
about $10.7 billion comprised of $2 billion in services and $8.7 billion in goods. New Zealand exports 
to the EU total $5.2 billion, comprised of $1.9 billion in services and $3.3 billion in goods (MFAT, 
2018d). Altogether, two-way trade between the two parties totals $22 billion annually, and even if 
trade with the UK is excluded from this amount, is still worth $16 billion to the world’s economy 
(MFAT, 2018a). The EU is an important goods market for New Zealand, particularly for high value 
agriculture goods (MFAT, 2018c).  
 
Due to the huge potential gains to the economy, New Zealand continued to lobby strongly for an FTA 
with the EU and in 2009 New Zealand formally proposed an FTA with the EU. Former New Zealand 
Foreign Minister Murray McCully has called the EU “a partner of first order importance for New 
Zealand” (Köllner, 2018, p. 446). However, the EU is reluctant to open their agriculture market to 
other competitors due to the political minefield that the EU would have to navigate (Köllner, 2018, p. 
447). The agriculture lobby in the EU are extremely strong and hold a lot of influence (Markovic et al., 




stopped the EU from reforming CAP to the extent needed, despite it becoming increasingly 
uneconomical and expensive (Markovic et al., 2012).  
 
However, in 2015, the EU and New Zealand committed to start the process of bilateral FTA 
negotiations and in 2017, the EU and New Zealand agreed to the scope of negotiations (Köllner, 
2018, p. 452). New Zealand continues to maintain strong links and enjoys a good reputation in the 
UK and to a lesser extent in France and Germany (Gibbons, 2008, p. 118). However, newer 
members of the EU do not feel the same sort of obligation towards New Zealand that some of the 
original members do due to a limited understanding of New Zealand interests (Gibbons, 2008, p. 
117). How the relationship between New Zealand and the EU is evolving after Brexit is of great 
interest. 
 
3.5 An Accidental Brexit  
 
On the 23rd of July 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU. The Leave result stunned most of the world 
including the leaders of the UK, as it was assumed the populist ideas expressed by Nigel Farage and 
Boris Johnson were only attractive to a small section of society (Shipman, 2016). However, the UK 
voted to leave the EU by 52% to 48% with a turnout of 72% (Moody, 2016). David Cameron resigned 
as Prime Minister on the 13th of July 2016 and was succeeded by Theresa May due to the political 
fallout from the result of the vote (Stamp, 2017). The reasoning behind Britain’s decision to leave the 
EU is complex and multifaceted Political commentators in the Remain camp and Leave camp offer 
differing perspectives depending on their bias. To fully understand and appreciate all perspectives, 
the historical context of the UK and the EU must be considered first.  
 
The UK joined the EEC in 1973 and held a referendum in 1975, which confirmed their membership 
(BBC, 2015). The EEC became what is now known as the EU in 1993 after the Maastricht Treaty was 
entered into force (Eur-Lex, 2016). However, even in the early days of the EEC, Euroscepticism has 
been a part of the British culture (Shipman, 2016). There was a percentage of the population who did 
not want to be part of the EU as they feared a loss of sovereignty, viewing EU laws and regulations 
as a threat and Brussels’ bureaucracy as a drag on the British economy (Ronald Inglehart & P Norris, 
2016, p. 6).  
 
Since the 2007 economic crisis, Euroscepticism has only increased and found an outlet in the 
populist party UK Independence (Ronald Inglehart & P Norris, 2016). While populist parties are only 
minor parties in the total electoral scheme, minor parties often exert substantial influence. UK 
Independence only won one seat in the 2015 general election but populist rhetoric used by the party 
spread and helped to pressure the Conservatives to call a referendum of the UK’s membership to the 




Minister David Cameron to placate Eurosceptics within the UK. Tim Shipman suggested in his book 
“All Out War” that had Tony Blair conducted the promised referendum on the European constitution, 
Brexit may not have happened as it would have “let all the steam out” (Shipman, 2016, p. 10345). 
Despite “the economics profession, [being] almost unanimous in its view that leaving the EU would 
make the UK economically worse off than would otherwise been the case” (Johnson & Mitchell, 2017, 
p. S12), Cameron and his allies did not accurately anticipate the public’s mood. 
 
World markets reacted quickly to Brexit as the British pound plummeted to a 31 year low against the 
dollar and over 2 trillion dollars were wiped off shares globally (Hobolt, 2016, p. 1259). Since the 
referendum, the Bank of England has reduced its projections of GDP growth, and both have 
predicted that the national income would be around 2.5% smaller by 2019 than had been expected in 
May of 2016 (Johnson & Mitchell, 2017, p. S15). 
 
Due to the overwhelming belief that the UK would not leave the EU, the UK Government had not 
created any contingency plans (Staff, 2017). Cameron has been accused of gross negligence over 
the lack of contingency plans (Wintour, 2016). For the past 40 years, as a member state of the EU, 
many aspects of the UK’s external relations are conducted partly or wholly through the EU (Mance, 
2016). Being a member-state of the EU means they surrender their right to negotiate or execute such 
treaties (Britain, 2016), meaning the UK has not negotiated or signed any trade deals in over 40 
years.  
 
Now the UK must create institutions that will administer any future trade deals, while at the same time 
negotiate an exit from the EU. The UK will forfeit business access of 1/3 of the world’s markets by 
value (CBI). 44% of Britain’s exports go to the EU, amounting to £220 billion out of £510 billion 
(Chapman, 2017) and if a withdrawal treaty is not agreed to, the UK will revert to WTO MFN status 
with the EU and all other nations that the EU has FTA’s with. Imports and exports between the UK 
and the EU will be tariffs at the WTO rate. While the average tariff is low, (about 2.6% for non-
agriculture products), cars and car parts would be taxed at 10% every time they crossed the UK-EU 
border and agriculture tariffs are significantly higher, rising to an average of over 35% for dairy 
products (WTO, 2017).   
 
Where the UK will look to create new trade, deals is not necessarily unknown. New Zealand is 
apparently “at or near the front of the queue” for a free trade deal with the UK once Brexit is 
completed (McCulloch, 2017), but what the economic consequences are to the world market without 
the UK having single market and preferential access into the EU remain to be seen.  
 
Brexit could be especially consequential with respect to the agricultural sector and trade, which is the 




agriculture sector is one of the most heavily protected sectors in the world, especially in Europe due 
to CAP. Within the UK, 60% of farm incomes come in the forms of EU subsidies and a report by 
Informa Agribusiness Intelligence estimates that without subsidies 90% of farms would collapse and 
land prices would crash (Robertson, 2017). What effect Brexit could have on New Zealand, in 
particular its agriculture sector, is being watched closely by many interested parties, including the 
New Zealand government and businesses.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
New Zealand had to learn how to adapt to changing circumstances in the international political 
economy when the UK joined the EEC in the 1970’s, and now has experience in negotiating FTA’s in 
asymmetric situations. With a change in economic and trade policy in the 1980’s, New Zealand is 
now one of the most open economies in the world and continues to be a firm supporter of free and 
open trade (MFAT, 2017b) (Nixon & Yeabsley, 2010a). Through the 1980 reforms, New Zealand now 
has a competitive agriculture sector that is not distorted by subsidies.  
 
Brexit has offered New Zealand the opportunity to use its nature as a small state to gain access to a 
market that is heavily protected and adverse to allowing further New Zealand agriculture exports in. 
Gaining further access will be a way to offset the potential negative impacts of Brexit on New 
Zealand’s agriculture sector. Having explored New Zealand’s agriculture history and contextualized 





Chapter Four: Findings from Key Respondents 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter reports the results of the semi-structured interviews1 with the fifteen political and 
economic actors and analyses the results by clustering the commentaries into themes. These 
interviews sought to discern and provide important insights into the short and long term diplomatic 
and trade risks and opportunities for New Zealand’s agriculture sector. The key themes that 
emerged, and which are discussed below, are as follows: uncertainty, New Zealand’s relationships 
with the UK and the EU, and potential impacts. 
 
These themes provide insights into the complexities of the Brexit negotiations and their potential 
outcomes. They will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5 in relation to how New Zealand ought 
to position itself to maximize leverage and influence the subsequent and future international trade 
negotiations with the UK and EU.  
 
4.2 Uncertainty  
 
Uncertainty surrounding Brexit was the most significant theme repeated in the interviews with all 
respondents. Concerns about uncertainty influenced discussion about the opportunities and risks for 
New Zealand’s agriculture sector. There is still a concern as to whether Brexit will eventuate and 
exactly what form the final deal will take. The polarisation of Brexit is impacting the UK’s politics, 
reputation and confidence and is adding to the uncertainty (PWC, 2016). But in the interviews, 
respondents were at pains to point out how uncertainty and the factors contributing to it must be 
appreciated so the impact on New Zealand can be understood. As a result, uncertainty is explored in 
the following section in the context of its impact on British and European relationships and local 
politics, which have flow on effects for agricultural trade for New Zealand.  
 
4.2.1 The United Kingdom, European Union and the final withdrawal treaty of Brexit  
 
All interviews began by discussing the likelihood of Brexit eventuating. All fifteen respondents 
expressed the view that Brexit would happen. Respondent three said “the people voted for Brexit, so 
we are going to do Brexit”. But predicting what form Brexit would take would be “foolish” according to 
four of the respondents. Therefore at the time of submission, the following quote remains true, “we 
can’t actually rule any scenario out yet” (Two, 2017).  
 
                                            




The EU had just rejected May’s Chequers plan and the UK was refusing to budge on their Northern 
Ireland stance (Parker, Barker, & Peel, 2018). The two parties have been unable to agree on the 
terms of the final withdrawal treaty of Brexit, as they have competing and incompatible objectives for 
the final outcome. The Conservative Government need to make Brexit a success as many 
government officials have staked their career on this (Three, 2017) and the EU needs to prove Brexit 
is a mistake to stop other member states from leaving (Erlanger, 2016). The differing objectives have 
added to the tension between the two parties. However, several Brexit scenarios were suggested 
during interviews by eight of the informants, including the Canada, Norwegian or Swiss model.  From 
the perspective of one respondent, “time has simply run out for a bespoke agreement” (Three, 2017). 
 
Respondents one and three expressed frustration at how the UK wants an agreement similar to 
Canada’s FTA but with extra privileges, beyond what the EU can offer. Respondent one described it 
as a Golf Club, where after 40 years one member (the UK) wants to leave but wants all the benefits 
still without having to pay. That is just not on for the other members. Respondent one argued that it 
looks as though the UK is trying to ‘cherry-pick’ and that the EU Commission is very unhappy with the 
way the British have been handling the whole situation. 
 
A Swiss or Norwegian solution has been suggested by the EU but according to respondent one,  
 
the Norwegian model and the Swiss model are both hugely complex and cumbersome and 
not in line with what the UK have been seeking. Norway pays significant fees for access into 
the EU, accepts EU regulations but has no say on the substance of the regulations. 
Switzerland has perhaps 100 different agreements with the EU, and ability to diverge on the 
regulatory front if it wishes, but should it do so EU processes would kick in to determine 
whether they should still be recognized or have access in those areas (One, 2017).  
 
Respondent eight stated “that if negotiations go badly then it will be a Norwegian model offered to the 
British, which is in line with what Barnier has suggested”. Three of the respondents believed staying 
in the single market is not considered a viable option at this point, as in order to opt in, the British will 
have to agree on the Four Freedoms. One of the Four Freedoms is the Freedom of Movement used 
heavily by the Leave campaign as a reason to leave (Münchau, 2017). At the time of interviewing, 
these respondents were unsure whether the UK would stay in the Customs Union but did suggest it 
may be a solution considering the problems that leaving it may bring to the movement of goods.  
 
As of May 2018, both the British and European media are reporting that the National Health Service 
(NHS) and the EU are constructing contingency plans for ‘no-deal’ Brexit or ‘crash-out’ (Hughes, 
2018) (Keohane & Hall, 2018). While the terminology has changed from Hard Brexit, to Cliff-edge to 




leaving, current regulations on things like cross-border trade and travel between the UK and EU ends 
overnight (Hunt & Wheeler, 2016). Without a trade agreement the UK has to deal with the EU under 
WTO rules (explained at section 3.5).  
 
Fourteen of the respondents who were asked about the possibility of a ‘no-deal’ agreed that “leaving 
without an agreement is intuitively impossible, but the risk is still there” (Three, 2017). Ten of the 
respondents discussed a transitional deal and argued that this would have to happen. On the 19th of 
March 2018, a transition period had been approved by both the UK and the EU but it would only 
apply if a final withdrawal treaty was settled upon (BBC, 2018). Respondents one and three both 
state that this would be the worst possible outcome for everyone involved, as “chaos is a reality- this 
is not scaremongering from the Remainers” (Three, 2017) However, one respondent expressed that 
within the UK, hard “Brexiteers” are angry May agreed to a transition deal as the UK will still be in the 
EU and will have to abide by EU rules but “outside because they will have no voice in policy” (Eight, 
2017). It is from this lack of certainty that the best strategy, offered by several respondents to all 
businesses and governments alike, is to plan for every single scenario (Seven, 2017; Three, 2017; 
Two, 2017).  
 
4.2.2  Leavers, Remainers and the European Union 
 
From the interviews and the various discussions on uncertainty, a sub theme of concern about 
polarization within UK politics and society also emerged. The internal politics of the UK, EU and the 
politics between the two parties gives greater insight into the uncertainty being conveyed to the rest 
of the world. For example, respondent one explains there is no consensus on leaving by the British 
bloc of the EU. Therefore, even if a final withdrawal treaty was agreed upon, New Zealand should not 
plan its agriculture trade sector solely around that outcome, as there is no guarantee this would 
actually happen.  
 
4.2.2.1 The Leavers and Remainers in British Politics 
 
Since the results of Brexit were announced, many respondents expressed concern about confusion 
and uncertainty in British domestic politics. Theresa May became Prime Minister after David 
Cameron’s resignation and in 2017, the Conservatives Party formed a Government with Northern 
Ireland party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) through a confidence and supply agreement 
(UKParliament, 2018). Concern was expressed by the British respondents that the Conservative 
Government looks ‘extraordinarily weak’, with seven respondents suggesting they were not sure that 
the Government would actually survive the process of Brexit. When discussing whether Brexit would 
actually happen, all respondents discussed how part of the uncertainty surrounding Brexit was due to 




One obvious implication for New Zealand trade is that it is very hard to know who to deal with in 
negotiations. For example, respondent two said “dialogue between the UK and New Zealand is very 
important”, but New Zealand has limited resources and cultivating relationships with every politician 
and public servant in the UK and the EU is near impossible.  
 
In the Conservative Government there are hardline Brexiteers, those who want a soft-Brexit and 
some who do not want Brexit at all (Pienaar, 2018). The debate within the Conservative party has (in 
the perspective of the respondents) stopped any coherent strategy being developed of how to 
approach negotiations with the EU. Respondent nine explains that  
 
Philip Hammond, (Chancellor of the Exchequer) wants to approach the Brexit talks in a ‘top 
down’ approach, with the assumption that the UK will remain aligned with the EU model, 
except in certain areas where the UK choses to opt-out of EU regulations. Boris Johnson 
(former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), wants the ‘bottom down’ 
approach, where the UK starts with a blank sheet of paper and the assumption that they can 
diverge in all areas except where it opts into EU regulations.  
 
Respondent six expressed the view that the Conservative Government and Cabinet are split and look 
‘very feeble and weak’ and gave an example of how on the 13th of December 2017, rebel Tories 
crossed party lines and voted with the opposition to give Parliament a legal guarantee of a vote on 
the final withdrawal treaty with Brussels (Kuenssberg, 2017). Within the other major party, Labour, 
there are the same divisions, with Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn being called a “leaver in disguise” 
by two of the respondents, despite most of his constituents being Remainers. A respondent remarked 
this lack of coherency within both parties is another obstacle to negotiating and implementing Brexit 
as “British politics is not a given at the moment” (Six, 2017). Brexit has cut across traditional party 
lines in the UK, contributing to the feeling of uncertainty being felt by respondents surrounding Brexit. 
 
4.2.2.2 The United Kingdom’s Reputation  
 
The UK’s reputation and relationship with the EU is also contributing to the uncertainty according to 
three respondents. They noted that how the EU is presented in the UK has caused significant 
problems. For example, as Respondent eight explained:  
 
“David Cameron would routinely criticize the EU and the British political class and 
commentators have enjoyed the last 20 years of denigrating the EU leading to a fundamental 
misunderstanding in the UK of what the EU is and what it does. When the Brexit referendum 






Many people blamed the EU for the immigration and economic problems the UK is experiencing 
(Ronald Inglehart & Pippa Norris, 2016). The Leave campaign used this negative stereotyping to their 
advantage by creating propaganda that was false, but reinforced the image that the political ruling 
class had created over the last 20 years (Shipman, 2016). Respondent ten suggested a fundamental 
misunderstanding led to the Brexit vote.  
 
Many respondents noted the Brexit vote was a “shock” to “everyone” involved. Respondent one said 
the feelings of “anger” and “disappointment” were palpable in Brussels. They felt as though the UK 
was turning their back on a relationship that has brought about 40 years of mutual benefits. However, 
as respondent one further explained, the EU are following the cues of the British and as they say they 




The UK now have to interact in the international political economy without the economic and political 
support of the EU. But another issue raised during interviews is the inexperience of the British 
government at negotiating. On the 29th of March 2017, Britain’s EU ambassador handed a letter to 
EU Council President Donald Tusk, formally triggering article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty (Government, 
2017). This is the mechanism that starts the clock on the two year exit process for leaving the EU. 
According to respondent one, this was against advice given by the former UK Ambassador to the EU, 
who advised the British government not to trigger Article 50 until they were sure how the process 
would be managed by the EU. Respondent three described the decision to trigger Article 50 as 
“jump[ing] the gun” while former Prime Minister David Cameron said it was “the gamble of the 
century” (Baker, 2016). The message from interviews was clear and best summed up by respondent 
one - it was silly to trigger Article 50 when they did as they did not have clarity about the processes 
involved. This created a very tight timeframe to “negotiate, approve and implement Brexit” (Three, 
2017).   
 
According to several respondents, while the letter to the EU was meant to begin Brexit, it actually 
signalled to the EU and the rest of the world how inexperienced the UK is at negotiating (Five, 2017). 
Respondent one said, “when they triggered Article 50 they gave up any leverage that they had”, while 
respondent four said in frustration, “we are still trying to negotiate the ‘divorce bill’ and we are trying 
to negotiate legislate and implement all at once”. Currently it appears as though the EU holds all the 
power, which suggests the UK will have to accept the EU’s terms on the ‘divorce’ (Grant, 2017).  
 
It was commented on by seven of the respondents that many government officials have staked their 




that Brexit was a way to “take control of Britain” (Three, 2017). The UK is doing everything in its 
power to conclude a deal with the EU on their terms. They are also trying to control the optics of 
Brexit by looking to traditional trade partners (Twelve, 2017). The UK have to negotiate and conclude 
their own trade deals quickly to maintain business confidence and New Zealand is seen as a natural 
ally (Patterson, 2018b).  
 
The lack of formal precedents for a nation-state exiting the EU is also causing uncertainty. 
Respondent one explained that the European Parliament has to vote on Brexit and with the time 
frame as it is, it will be one of the last votes of the current Parliament. Further,  
 
within the British bloc of the EU, there is no consensus about leaving and with public 
resistance mounting in the UK there is no certainty that they will vote in favour of the bill, just 
as there is no certainty that MP’s in the British Parliament will vote in favour of the bill either. 
There is also the problem of Nigel Farage, who was key in the Leaver’s win. Respondent 3 
explained that most of the British bloc of the EU and the rest of the EU really do not like him 
and would love to not give him what he wants.   
 
4.2.3 Uncertainty conclusion 
 
The speed of the Brexit decision, the lack of detailed plans prior to the British referendum, and the 
absence of formal precedents for a nation-state to exit the EU has caused considerable uncertainty 
that has weakened the May Government’s credibility and bargaining power. New Zealand’s 
government and businesses will have to explore this uncertainty to ensure New Zealand deploys a 




As was explained in Chapter 3, New Zealand and the UK have a strong political relationship 
established in colonial times. But beyond the problems of uncertainty discussed above, Brexit has 
impacted the New Zealand and UK relationship. This relationship had consequently formed the basis 
of the ensuing political and trade relationship with the EU. The effect of change in Brexit is to directly 
impact on the relationships between New Zealand and both Britain and the EU. During interviews, 
New Zealand’s relationship with the UK and the EU was inevitably raised by respondents and during 
analysis, the theme of relationships became apparent as ‘trade agreements are often more about 
“opening minds, than markets” (Nine, 2018). It is important to note that all New Zealand respondents 
spoke of how important both the UK and the EU relationship is to New Zealand. It was made very 
clear during interviews by the New Zealand respondents that while New Zealand does not want to 




respondents perceived the impact of Brexit on New Zealand’s current relationship with both parties 
and Chapter 5 will expand upon the significance of relationships on New Zealand’s adaptive trade 
policy.  
 
4.3.1 The United Kingdom   
 
As established above, fifteen respondents discussed the current status of New Zealand’s relationship 
with the relevant party. What was particularly interesting to note was how the ‘old guard of British 
trade’ spoke of New Zealand. Despite the UK joining the EEC in 1973, there is still ‘maternal’ 
sentiment on behalf of the older British respondents interviewed. Respondent six, who was working 
for the UK Government during the time that the UK was negotiating to enter the EEC, reminisced 
about how worried people in the UK were about New Zealand during and after the UK officially joined 
the EEC. This maternal sentiment was not as strong when discussing New Zealand’s relationship 
with younger respondents.  
 
Four other respondents also discussed the residual emotional ties between the UK and New 
Zealand. New Zealand’s shared history, similar legal systems, common language, shared ideals and 
similar outlooks have contributed to their strong relationship with the UK. This has allowed New 
Zealand’s governments and businesses to use London as a starting point into the EU.  
 
4.3.2 The European Union  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, New Zealand’s relationship with the EU is mainly a consequence of New 
Zealand’s relationship with the UK. Trade commitments were made during the 1970’s when the UK 
was joining the EEC and during the WTO Uruguay Round. As respondent one stressed, going 
forward New Zealand will “have to up its game with other nations in Europe to ensure our interests 
are protected and advanced. With most we don’t have the same sort of ties as we do with the UK”. 
On the 22nd of May 2018, the Council of the EU adopted the decision authorising the opening of 
negotiations for an FTA between the EU and New Zealand (MFAT, 2018c). While this is a step in a 
positive direction, respondent nine remarked New Zealand is at a disadvantage due to New Zealand 
being one of the last six nations in the WTO to not have an FTA with the EU. As one of the last 
countries that the EU deals with New Zealand must be highly engaged in the process.  
 
At the time of interviewing, the FTA between the EU and New Zealand had not been announced. 
However, it is important to note that five respondents did speak of wanting to strengthen New 
Zealand’s links with the EU outside of the UK.  As respondent one explains, while we appreciate the 




respondent noted that New Zealand has responded by trying to strengthen their links with other EU 
nations. 
 
4.3.3 Presence and Relevance 
 
An issue that came through strongly in interviews with New Zealanders was gaining and maintaining 
relevance in the UK and EU. Respondent two spoke about how New Zealand diplomats and advisors 
in London would have to “spend a lot of time and energy on keeping the lights on so to speak” as 
“relationships are vital and New Zealand needs to work hard to remain visible and topical as the UK 
can survive without us”. Overall, New Zealand respondents all stressed how important the UK and 
EU are to New Zealand, and how “we must manage the relationships correctly” as this enables New 
Zealand to mitigate the risk of Brexit (Two, 2017), and embrace the positive impacts for New Zealand 
as much as possible. Many of the New Zealand respondents expressed the belief that separate 
relationships with the UK and EU would actually help New Zealand to gain greater trade access, 
through deepening and expanding the existing ties. However, a concern shared by many of these 
respondents was whether New Zealand would be able to devote the time and resources needed to 
accomplish this.  
 
In response to asking how New Zealand could encourage their relationships with both the UK and the 
EU, several respondents were adamant the key was through political relationships. According to 
respondent nine, the relationship between the UK and New Zealand was very strong under National 
but “Labour needs to continue the momentum and step it up even more”. Respondent twelve 
discussed how many other nations will be vying for an agreement, especially those who are direct 
competitors to New Zealand goods. Therefore, it was suggested by three different respondents that:  
 
David Parker, New Zealand’s Minister for Trade and Export Growth and Damien O’Connor, 
New Zealand’s Minister for Agriculture, Bio Security and Minister of State for Trade and 
Export Growth, need to go to the UK and the EU. It was also suggested by respondent nine 
that “an economic development team is needed on the ground”.  
 
One respondent proclaimed that “New Zealand (government and businesses) still haven’t quite 
grasped how hard we are going to have to work and what we are going to have to do to maintain our 
presence (Nine, 2018)”. Ultimately the message from all New Zealand respondents was that “due to 
New Zealand’s small size and economy, New Zealand must work hard to continue our presence in 






4.3.4 Relationships Conclusion  
 
New Zealand’s strong relationship with the UK paved the way for its subsequent relationship with the 
EU. However, New Zealand will have to focus considerable attention on the EU in order to foster a 
relationship on par with what New Zealand shares with the UK. The EU will have to be the priority at 
this stage due to the subsequent negotiations on an FTA between New Zealand and the EU. New 
Zealand will also have to continue to nurture its relationship with the UK, as there will be many other 
nations (especially those who are New Zealand’s competitors) who will be wanting to establish trade 
deals with the UK once Brexit is finalized.  
 
4.4 Vigilance or Naivety?  
 
Brexit will change the international political economies world order and therefore New Zealand will 
have to adapt to the changes. How prepared is New Zealand with all of the uncertainty surrounding 
Brexit and the change in the international political economy? Vigilance emerged as a theme in 
interviewing, with many respondents questioning how prepared the New Zealand government, 
businesses and the agriculture sector were to respond to Brexit.  
 
4.4.1 Bi-partisan Trade Policy  
 
At the time of interviewing, New Zealand had just undergone a national election, whereby New 
Zealand’s Labour Party formed a coalition government with the New Zealand First Party and the 
Green Party. The National Party had been governing for the previous nine years, and although the 
coalition parties promised new policies and changes, trade policy is one area that has and will remain 
relatively untouched. When asked on the 3rd of April 2017 at the University of Canterbury what 
changes Labour would implement to foreign affairs and trade that National would agree with, former 
Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister and National MP Murray McCully, replied that in the realm of 
international trade policy and foreign affairs, the agenda is set years in advance and even if there 
were to be a change in government, little would change in the strategy and goals. New Zealand relies 
on free trade due to their size and location in the world, so New Zealanders can sustain their 
standard of living. Therefore, New Zealand’s international trade policy across the two major parties is 
predominantly bi-partisan. 
 
When New Zealand respondents were asked how the change in New Zealand’s government would 
impact the trade agenda, they confirmed the former Minister’s statement, with some extra detail.  
 
The coalition Government may look to bring in more sustainable deals and elements to New 




benefits from improved market access flow to the wider New Zealand. But ultimately, New 
Zealand’s international trade policy across the two major parties is predominantly bi-partisan.  
 
However, as was discussed above in 4.3.3, several respondents suggested that the Government, 
and those who do not work directly in international trade, are not aware of how hard they are going to 
have to work to maintain relevance in the UK and the EU. It was made clear during interviews that 
this applies to both the past and present Governments of New Zealand.   
 
4.4.2 The Agriculture Sector  
 
New Zealand is the world’s 12th largest agriculture exporter (by value) and maintains a comparative 
advantage in production of agriculture goods. However, whether New Zealand businesses are able to 
position itself accordingly so that they are not adversely effected by Brexit is questionable.  
 
According to respondents three and nine:  
 
New Zealand’s goods and exporting sector are highly regarded around the world due to the 
high quality agriculture goods that are produced and how much experience large New 
Zealand businesses have in trade. New Zealand also appears to be rejecting intensive 
farming and embracing grass fed, hormone free, antibiotic free, GM free and natural 
production farming (Nine, 2018). As the rest of the world moves towards intensive farming to 
feed the world’s growing population, New Zealand could be able to dominate this niche 
market (Three, 2017).   
 
However, New Zealand businesses do have some quite significant issues, that came up with three 
economic respondents. To their great detriment New Zealand businesses do not understand how 
tariffs work (Nine, 2018). This is not to say all businesses misunderstand tariffs, four respondents 
provided an exception to their statement as both Fonterra and Beef and Lamb have an exceptionally 
good grasp on the issue due to the multinational nature of their companies. However, smaller 
businesses may miss out on economic gains and profits due to their lack of knowledge of how tariffs 
work. For example,  
 
“there is a huge demand for New Zealand onions in France, however tariffs are not invoiced 
separately, and it is included in the landed price. Exporting companies also share part of the 






4.4.3 A Naïve Conclusion  
 
Ultimately, there appeared to be quite a bit of naivety on behalf of those not directly involved with 
New Zealand’s international trade. The New Zealand government will “have to be on the ball, as once 
we are out we may never be able to get in and/or would have to give up a lot more than what we may 
have had to originally give up” (Nine, 2018). Policy advice will be offered in Chapter five to overcome 




Discussion of the theme of uncertainty, and how cleavages and politics have impacted upon any 
certainty, help to inform New Zealanders of the impacts on New Zealand’s agriculture sector. While 
New Zealand’s government and businesses cannot rule out any scenario, they can determine 
general impacts and how to mitigate these risks (Nine, 2018; One, 2017; Seven, 2017; Three, 2017; 
Two, 2017; Vermeulen et al., 2013). This section will discuss the potential impacts of Brexit on New 
Zealand under the themes of the good, the bad, the ugly and the awkward.   
 
4.5.1 The Good  
 
As mentioned in 4.2.1, no one can predict the final outcome of Brexit and any opportunities discussed 
at this stage are only suppositions. New Zealand will not know it’s standing until the final form of 
Brexit is announced (Seven, 2017). But there are some opportunities that can be planned for. With 
near certainty, New Zealand has opportunities in the ICT sector and there is potential for easier 
movement between the UK and New Zealand (Walls, 2017). However, in regards to New Zealand’s 
agriculture sector, according to many of the respondents, the biggest potential opportunities are 
FTA’s with both the EU and the UK, and a reform of CAP in the UK (Five, 2017; Nine, 2018; One, 
2017; Seven, 2017; Twelve, 2017; Two, 2017).  
 
4.5.1.1 New Zealand- United Kingdom Free Trade Agreement  
 
While most of the respondents interviewed were against Brexit, especially those of British citizenship, 
three of New Zealand’s respondents had a slightly different perspective on the situation. While they 
disagreed with Brexit on a fundamental level, they took a pragmatic approach to Brexit, arguing that 
ultimately New Zealand would benefit from a pro-independent Britain that is outward looking (Nine, 
2018; Seven, 2017; Two, 2017). 
 
If the end result is a ‘soft Brexit’ where the UK opts into the single market and adopted EU 




is a problem for New Zealand, as the closer the UK is to the EU, the harder it will be for the UK to 
look outward to other countries”. Respondent’s twelve and thirteen suggested that Brexit is an 
opportunity for New Zealand to reassess their relationship with the UK and the EU. Ultimately, what 
New Zealand wants and should encourage is an outward looking, pro-independent Britain and when 
Brexit is complete, New Zealand should strive towards negotiating and completing a bilateral 
agreement with the UK (Nine, 2018). But to achieve this, New Zealand must position themselves 
without being seen to take advantage of Brexit (Eleven, 2018; Nine, 2018). 
 
One British respondent felt that “any trade deal between New Zealand and the UK would be more 
about deepening their cultural and political ties rather than economics” (Four, 2017) due to the 
structural differences and distance between the two states. Respondent four explained his 
perspective through the use of the ‘gravity trade model’ (GMT) and explained that under GMT logic, 
relative sized economic countries are attracted to each other and those that are not similar sized, 
tend to trade less. Relative size is determined by current GDP and economic proximity is determined 
by trade costs - the more economically distant the greater the trade costs (De Benedictis & Salvatici, 
2011). GMT is structural, as New Zealand has a much lower GDP than the UK and the EU.  
 
Another British respondent collaborated respondent four’s remarks and discussed that the differing 
size of the economies and distance between the two states are barriers to any potential FTAs. He 
ultimately concluded that Brexit is not an opportunity to re-assess due to the structural nature of the 
relationship. However, he did also say that “there is a real opportunity to make the relationship 
stronger and to make New Zealand a strong and important trading partner” of the UK due to “the 
same philosophical approach to trade policy” (Four, 2017).   
 
New Zealand respondent nine agreed but was slightly more hopeful about how beneficial a trade deal 
between the two states could be for New Zealand stating, “trade agreements are often more about 
opening minds than markets and once this occurs then it usually becomes easier to trade in that 
country”. This, he said, is because “when there is a reduction of tariffs, companies look to those 
countries to build partnerships and other commercial arrangements and often trade grows in spite of 
tariff relief, when there has been a deepening of an existing relationship”. 
 
However, two other British respondents felt differently to respondent four due to the situation that the 
UK has found itself in. One explained that New Zealand has been given extensive negotiating power 
by Brexit, as the UK needs to prove that they can survive and negotiate trade deals outside of the 
EU. Timing is important and if New Zealand is tactical, they may be able to walk away with very 
favourable FTA (Twelve, 2017). The other respondent stated “play hardball and just give a trade deal 
to Theresa May. They will sign anything now. They need to look as though they can negotiate” 




4.5.1.2 New Zealand-European Union Free Trade Agreement  
 
In 2009, New Zealand formally proposed an FTA with the EU and in 2017/2018 both sides finalized 
their mandate for negotiations (MFAT, 2018b). Two-way trade with the EU is worth $16 billion per 
year (MFAT, 2018b). However as discussed in 3.2. and 3.4, New Zealand is constrained by CAP and 
has limited access to the EU market.  
 
Nevertheless, there is potential to reduce tariffs and greater access into the EU with an FTA. An FTA 
with the EU is a huge opportunity for New Zealand due to being New Zealand’s largest source of 
imports and third largest export market (MFAT, 2018d). The EU estimates that an FTA with New 
Zealand could result in a GDP boost for New Zealand of between $1.2 billion and 2 billion, and a 10 
to 20% increase in exports (Patterson, 2018a). The sectors of agriculture, motor equipment, 
machinery, processed foods and services will be the main beneficiaries (Patterson, 2018a).  
 
In 2017, while the EU and New Zealand had announced their intention to negotiate an FTA in 2015, 
not much movement had occurred (MFAT, 2018b). Therefore, during interviews, an FTA between 
New Zealand and the EU had been discussed in a hopeful but abstract way by five respondents. 
Respondent five spoke about how New Zealand imports more dairy from EU than exports and a deal 
would potentially allow New Zealand more access into the market. Respondent nine spoke of the 
huge demand France has for New Zealand onions, however tariffs take most of the money away from 
New Zealand producers. New Zealand has struggled to get the EU to commit to an FTA for years; 
however with Brexit, the EU appears to have adjusted their position. What the implications of this are 
will be discussed in Chapter Five. Since these interviews have taken place, it has been announced 
that a NZ-EU FTA will be negotiated and is currently taking place (MFAT, 2018g). It is suggested by 
NZ and the EU that negotiations will take two to three years to conclude (MFAT, 2018g).  
 
4.5.1.3 The Common Agriculture Policy and a Market Based Approach  
 
Another opportunity for New Zealand’s agriculture sector is the potential to overhaul CAP in the UK. 
Policy Exchange, a think tank in the UK produced a report in 2017, called Farming Tomorrow, where 
it called on the Government to phase out subsidies on food production by 2025. Instead the subsidies 
could be used to incentivise other behaviour, such as protecting the environment. The funds could 
then be diverted to other public goods, such as to the NHS. It was also suggested that the UK lower 
tariffs on agriculture goods to allow for cheaper imports. Warwick Lightfoot, director of research, 
argued that Brexit was a chance to get away from some of the “oddities that have emerged under 
CAP” and that the UK should be “accepting we don’t have a comparative advantage in the sort of 
meat you can get from Australia, New Zealand and Argentina, which is a high-quality product at a 





Ten out of the fifteen respondents were asked about CAP and it was found that reforms are more 
likely in the UK, as they will not have the same access to funds (Four, 2017; Three, 2017). May’s 
Government has promised farmers to continue to fund CAP at the current level until 2022, but it was 
suggested by several respondents that, eventually the sector will move away from subsidies and 
farmers will have to learn to survive on their own merits. According to respondents five, eight and 
nine a reform of CAP is accepted, to a degree, by the National Farmers Union (NFU) in the UK. The 
farming sector is not seen as a priority. Respondent seven spoke of a leaked report commissioned by 
the UK government, and how it analyses how each industry will be hit under each economic scenario 
of Brexit (Parker, Pickard, & Hughes, 2018). This report did not mention dairy, with respondent five 
remarking that the dairy industry know they will be used as a bargaining chip in the Brexit 
negotiations.  
 
The UK government is much more concerned with how the British financial sector will impacted (Five, 
2017; Parker, Pickard, et al., 2018). This is because the leaked report confirms that the UK will be left 
worse off under all economic scenarios after Brexit with financial services, manufacturing and 
retailing being among the worst hit industries (Parker, Pickard, et al., 2018). There is a predicted fall 
in growth between 2%-8% over the next 15 years, with a soft Brexit being at 2%, an FTA with the EU 
being at 5% and ‘no deal’ being 8% (Parker, Pickard, et al., 2018). How the UK government will be 
able to afford the CAP at the current level of funds is questionable, which could encourage a reform 
(Three, 2017). What is important to take into consideration is that reportedly, UK farmers voted to 
leave because they were frustrated by the EU systems and rules that stop them from being 
competitors in food production (Gordon, 2018). It has also been reported in the news that subsidies 
do not end up in the farmers pocket but go to big businesses (Beament, 2017; Chaffin, 2010). 
 
New Zealand would be in good position to leverage their experience due to their own reforms in the 
1980’s and may be able to help shape a new CAP in the UK (Five, 2017). What occurs in the UK 
could potentially inspire the EU to take the same steps. This would result in better returns for New 
Zealand producers and they would not be competing against the cost of a subsidized product (Five, 
2017).  
 
However, the British respondents were slightly more reserved in their assessment of a potential 
reform of CAP. Respondent three argued that the current Conservative UK government is slightly 
constrained in terms of how much they can reform the farming sector, due to the farming sector being 
their traditional voter base. Respondent four stated that they would be surprised if they did reform the 
sector due to the risk of alienation of voters, especially in a time when the Conservative Party is so 
weak. What this means specifically for New Zealand’s agriculture sector will be discussed in greater 




4.5.2 The Bad 
 
Brexit has many associated risks for New Zealand’s agriculture sector including a recession in the 
UK. This section will look at the economy and how a recession could be detrimental to New Zealand 
interests.  
 
4.5.2.1 The British Economy  
 
As was outlined in 3.5, the international economy did not react well to the Brexit vote. Six 
respondents discussed the economy, with four explaining the significance to New Zealand 
agriculture. According to respondent eight, inflation has emerged as a real social and political 
problem due to the pound being devalued after Brexit and many think it will probably devalue further 
(Seven, 2017). 
 
The immediate effect on New Zealand has been easy to recognize, as it had an immediate impact on 
New Zealand exporters and would place further pressure on exporters as exports become cheaper 
(Nine, 2018; Seven, 2017). The long term impact of Brexit is harder to identify. As discussed in 
4.5.1.3, there is a predicted fall in growth between 2%-8% but this will be largely determined by the 
final withdrawal treaty and form of Brexit that is yet to be determined. However, as three respondents 
explained, there is a risk of disruption to markets, due to slower growth or a recession in the UK as a 
result of Brexit, depending upon the terms of the withdrawal agreement, the scope and timing of a 
future trade agreement (One, 2017; Seven, 2017; Two, 2017). As respondent six said, “there will be 
five to ten years of really bad times - there will be a recession”, he also doubted “whether the UK 
would ever fully recover from Brexit”.  
 
If this happens, pressure could be put on the UK and EU governments to protect the agriculture 
sector by lobby groups, farmers and other contractors associated with agriculture. There is the need 
to be acutely aware of those “who would like to move to a more protectionist stance i.e. Little Britain” 
(Three, 2017). The need to protect their “own” and employing protectionist policies is completely 
contradictory to what New Zealand wants in terms of a market based agriculture sector in the UK and 
EU. Therefore, the opportunities expanded upon above (an FTA and a reformed CAP) would be in 
direct conflict to the realities of the UK economy. 
 
4.5.3 The Ugly  
 
There were two very ‘ugly’ implications in particular that came through in the interviews. One was the 
potential of a crash-out scenario and the other was how the TRQ’s were being dealt with. All New 
Zealand respondents were concerned about these impacts and have been watching how the process 




4.5.3.1 Crash-Out   
 
Four New Zealand respondents spoke about how New Zealand may have to contend with the ‘no-
deal’ or ‘crash-out’ scenario which could badly impact global trade. This is looking increasingly likely 
as Mark Carney, the governor of the Bank of England, called the level of risk “uncomfortably high” 
(Perriog, 2018) and Liam Fox, UK Trade Secretary, admitted that there is a 60% chance of the UK 
leaving without a deal (Bond & Toplensky, 2018).  
 
On the 30th of September 2018, the New York Times published an article detailing what stage the UK 
government is at six months before 29th of March 2019, the date of Brexit (Barry & Castle, 2018). It 
was ultimately found that the UK is still in the same position as what they were the morning after the 
Brexit vote, with no clear plan of how to proceed. Theresa May’s Chequers plan has been rejected by 
EU members, there is infighting within the Conservative government – along with a potential 
leadership bid by Boris Johnson, and the leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn has announced 
that Parliament will vote down any deal that may be struck by Theresa May. The tone of the article 
was bleak, although some sources in the article argued that Theresa May is in a stronger position the 
closer Brexit becomes as the EU will want to avoid a crash out as much as the UK.  
 
However, the UK is in a much more precarious position than the EU. If a crash out occurs, there 
could be black outs and 20% cost increase on power due to the location of energy generators, a 
minister has been appointed by the Government to guarantee food supply, and medical supplies are 
under threat with companies working to stockpile at least six weeks of supplies. There is also the 
possibility that planes and ships may not be able to enter EU countries from the UK and vice versa 
(Barry & Castle, 2018). The EU will experience some disruption but not to the same extent as the UK. 
The crash out scenario remains a very real threat that New Zealand’s agriculture sector should be 
aware of.  
 
The full extent of how this will impact New Zealand is not known at this stage. However, respondents 
offered some educated guesses that can be used to help inform New Zealand’s agriculture sector of 
potential implications. New Zealand’s economy may be damaged as there is the potential of an 
oversupply of agriculture goods within the UK, which causes a drop in price of the good and its 
supply chains within Europe will be under threat.  
 
Two of the respondents compared the ‘no-deal’ scenario to the effect sanctions placed on Russia in 
2014 in the wake of the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Ukraine had on the global economy 
(Gordon, Kavanagh, Oakley, & Stothard, 2014). Some estimates suggest that in terms of impact on 
the global dairy market, a ‘no-deal’ is worse. “It makes the [effect of the] Russian embargo look tiny” 




Zealand’s largest export sector (graph 1.2), which contributed $7.8 billion to New Zealand’s GDP in 
2017. Trade between the two parties will be regulated by WTO rules and tariffs (Perriog, 2018). Two 
respondents identified the potential impact this would have on New Zealand’s lamb sector. 
Respondent seven explained that,  
 
The UK currently exports a third of their lamb to the EU. This will no longer be exported if the 
UK’s tariffs with the EU go to WTO rates, therefore creating an oversupply of lamb within the 
UK with a significant impact on domestic prices. 
 
New Zealand will not be getting the same returns on lamb exports from the UK. Coupled with the 
TRQ situation, there is cause for concern. The TRQ situation will be discussed further in 4.5.3.2.  
 
Another cause for concern if the UK does ‘crash-out’ is the threat on New Zealand’s global value 
chain (Five, 2017). The UK will leave the EU without any of the trade, customs and regulatory 
measures that are provided as ‘public goods’ by the EU (Three, 2017). At present there are no 
significant delays and no customs costs, but with Brexit, duties, goods and services tax, and checks 
at the border will have to be added (One, 2017). The UK will have to employ 5000 people to police 
the borders. To train a customs officer is a huge expense and can take upwards of three years 
depending on the country but at the very least one year (Three, 2017).  
 
The logistics of the UK leaving the EU are only just starting to be realized by the general public even 
now. Respondent three argued that the British public did not realize what exactly the EU provides in 
terms of public goods in regard to EU regulations and supply lines, that help to keep the cost of 
goods down. Respondent one spoke about  
 
the economic impacts from exiting the customs union and how these extra costs would be 
passed onto the consumer. Cars, parts and people move back and forwards between the UK 
and EU-27 on ‘just in time’ basis. Bailey’s Irish Cream moves back and forwards across the 
Irish border five times before it is finished (One, 2017)  
 
New Zealand will also have to contend with additional costs, for example:  
 
Fonterra produces lactose in the Netherlands, that is then sent to the UK and manufactured 
into GOS, then sent to Australia, before finally being sold in China as infant formula. As 
respondent five stated, “Brexit makes the Global Value Chain look less appealing through 





Theresa May and her government have been trying to facilitate a transition deal to ease the impact of 
the loss of these public goods, but as was explained in section 4.2.1, a transitional period is 
contingent upon both parties agreeing on the final withdrawal treaty. If a ‘no-deal’ scenario 
eventuates, this will break the promise made to the public by May’s Government, that Brexit would 
result in ‘frictionless free trade’ (One, 2017).  
 
4.5.3.2 Trade Rate Quotas  
 
Before travelling to Europe, it became apparent in the media that TRQ’s were a huge source of worry 
for New Zealand agriculture producers and the government (Honey, 2017). All respondents 
discussed the key TRQ challenges for New Zealand. One British respondent suggested  
 
that deals would be done and unfortunately due to New Zealand’s size, they will have to take 
what has been given to them. They also expressed that the USA will probably have more of 
an impact in the ensuring stand-off but ultimately it will be sorted out (Four, 2017).  
 
New Zealand respondents have a different perspective on the TRQ’s. Since the interviews have 
taken place, it has been announced that due to Brexit, the current system of TRQ’s will change. The 
current proposal suggests TRQ’s would be divided based on historical averages of where New 
Zealand exports have gone previously (Various, 2017). New Zealand respondents are determined to 
maintain the status quo as this would cause New Zealand to lose flexibility in where their exports are 
sent depending on the market demand at the time (Seven, 2017). As discussed in 4.4.3.1, domestic 
lamb prices in the UK may fall significantly if a crash-out occurs. New Zealand will not be able to 
move its lamb exports around the remaining 27 EU member states, due to the change in the TRQ 
rules and its returns on lamb will decrease significantly with oversupply in the UK.  
 
It was also suggested that there is the risk that the data doesn’t tell the full story. Product imported to 
the EU arrives in Southampton in the UK but may end up in France (Five, 2017; One, 2017; Two, 
2017). This loss of flexibility will create a fight that is ‘ugly’ as  
 
“New Zealand will be fighting tooth and nail to retain current EU and UK access and also the 
flexibility to be able to sell in all markets”, as anything that reduces the flexibility will “decrease 
our returns” (Nine, 2018)  
 
Respondent seven explained that while New Zealand’s dairy sector use very little of its TRQ access, 
splitting TRQ’s is a huge risk for New Zealand, as the flexibility that TRQ’s provide is how we get 
value from the market. At present, the perspective of New Zealand is for the all the TRQ access to 




4.5.4 The Awkward  
 
There are several awkward impacts on New Zealand’s agriculture trading sector. These impacts are 
neither good nor bad but New Zealand government and businesses are going to have to be well 
prepared, aware, and tread carefully to ensure these impacts are managed correctly. A ‘soft-Brexit’, 
whether New Zealand will be one of the first countries to get an FTA with the UK, and New Zealand’s 





The ‘soft-Brexit’ option was discussed at 4.5.1.1 and is preferable to a crash-out in the perspective of 
six of the respondents, as regulations will be in place to keep the global supply chain working and 
keep tariffs and custom costs low. However, it does have a disadvantage according to respondent 
nine, as it will keep the UK in the orbit of the EU and vice versa. This will not allow New Zealand to 
explore separate relationships with the UK and the EU. This will be discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 5.  
 
4.5.4.2 First in Line?   
 
In the media it has been widely reported that New Zealand will be first in line for a trade deal with the 
UK (Patterson, 2018b). However, respondent four disputed the genuineness of the remarks made by 
the UK for several reasons: 
 
The UK will try to replicate some of the deals that the EU has i.e. South Korea, Canada. 
Therefore, these two countries will probably be at the front of the queue when it comes to an 
FTA with the UK. The reasons behind this are structural; these countries have bigger markets 
and therefore have more to offer the UK. Further the UK will be able to ‘copy and paste’ these 
agreements without much time and effort compared to New Zealand (Four, 2017).  
 
While New Zealand is currently negotiating an FTA with the EU, it takes years to conduct and 
conclude an FTA (as was explained in 4.5.1). The remarks made by respondents four and six in 
4.5.1.1, in relation to structural differences, need to also be remembered. New Zealand does not 
have as an attractive economy and structure as South Korea or Canada.  
 
4.5.4.3 Is New Zealand able to fill the gap? 
 
Another issue that was suggested by respondent twelve, is that New Zealand’s competitors in lamb, 




for example, exports 78,000 tonnes of cheddar to the UK every year (Marks, 2017). If the UK crashes 
out of the EU, the UK will have to find new suppliers. New Zealand respondents one, five and nine  
 
identified this as a huge opportunity for New Zealand. But there are potential problems with 
this goal that need to be considered. Firstly, whether New Zealand producers would be able 
to take advantage of cheddar demand, and secondly, New Zealand competitors attempting to 
also take advantage of the lack of supply.  
 
This does not just apply to cheddar, this also applies to any gaps left by Brexit. Respondent fifteen 
stated that he believed New Zealand  
 
“businesses wouldn’t be in a strong position to take advantage of the opportunity. Likely 
because very few New Zealand businesses have the available capital on hand to commit 
quickly to a new opportunity with scale”.  
 
Respondent five was worried that not only would this would allow New Zealand’s competitors to fill 
the gap but could also lead to price inflation of a good, if there is an oversupply in the market. Several 
respondents explained that rushing to fill the void left by the EU or UK needs to be handled with care 
and strategy, but particularly through continuing to cultivate the relationships with the EU and the UK. 
This will be discussed further in Chapter 5.   
 
4.5.4.4 New Zealand’s Image  
 
New Zealand’s image in the UK and the EU is also an issue. Respondent five explained that  
 
some in Europe hold the mental model that we’re a very low cost producer of dairy products 
and therefore that we send in bulk at cheaper prices to Europe, flooding the market. There is 
also the view that New Zealand has lower animal welfare and environmental standards which 
mean our farmers are able to produce product more cheaply, which gives us an unfair 
advantage over EU farmers.  
 
This view comes from the 70’s and 80’s and despite New Zealand advertising their ‘clean green 
image’ this has not done enough to change the perspective of European producers (Five, 2017). The 
respondent went on to state that European agriculture producers view is very incorrect but 






UK and EU farmers and officials will fight to stop New Zealand goods from being imported as 
ultimately, this view is all about how “deeply fearful [they are] of us as a competitive threat” 
(Nine, 2018).  
 
4.6 Impacts Conclusion  
 
Brexit has created many opportunities for New Zealand’s agriculture sector, including access into the 
EU and the UK and the potential to reform CAP. However, there are also many risks such as the 
British economy, a potential crash out and splitting TRQ’s. How New Zealand’s government and 
businesses manage Brexit and the opportunities and risks that it brings, will be of great significance 
to New Zealand society. The implications of these findings and how New Zealand can minimise these 
risks will be discussed in Chapter 5.   
 
4.7 Findings Conclusion  
 
This Chapter reported on and analysing the results by clustering the commentaries into themes of 
uncertainty, New Zealand’s relationships with the UK and the EU and potential impacts. These 
interviews and themes provided the short - and long - term diplomatic and trade risks and 
opportunities for New Zealand’s agriculture sector through providing insights into the complexities of 
the Brexit negotiations and their potential outcomes. Chapter 5 will discuss these findings in greater 
depth in relation to how New Zealand ought to position itself to maximize leverage and influence the 






Chapter Five: Implications from interviews for understanding New 




Chapter 4 reported on and analysed the results of the semi-structured interviews with the fifteen 
political and economic actors by clustering the commentaries into themes. The key themes that 
emerged, and which are discussed above, were: uncertainty, New Zealand’s relationships with the 
UK and the EU and potential impacts. These themes determined the short and long term diplomatic 
and trade risks and opportunities for New Zealand’s agriculture sector through providing insights into 
the complexities of the Brexit negotiations and their potential outcomes. Chapter 5 will now discuss 
these themes in greater depth in relation to how New Zealand ought to position itself to maximize 
leverage and influence the subsequent and future international trade negotiations with the EU and 
UK.  
 
5.2 Jack, the Giant Killer: Small State Leverage in a Global Market?   
 
New Zealand is a small state that is heavily dependent on international markets, and possesses a 
high degree of economic openness, equating to New Zealand being susceptible to changes in the 
international political economy (Fox, 1959; Köllner, 2018). Brexit poses significant challenges to New 
Zealand’s agriculture change through the re-writing of the rules of the international political economy 
and trade access into the EU (Honey, 2017). Further, as discussed in Chapter 2, the theory of 
asymmetric relationships holds that the largest party holds the power (Bilal et al., 2011). 
 
However, while New Zealand is unable to exert any control over events, it is not powerless in the 
international political economy. New Zealand, as a small state, is able to manoeuvre quickly when 
confronted with tension and changes in the sphere of influence of the international political economy 
(Baldacchino & Bertram, 2009; Ingebritsen, 2010; Katzenstein, 1985). This derivative power may 
enable New Zealand to negotiate a favourable trade deal with the more powerful states of the UK and 
the EU (Handel, 1981). Jones (2013) Hoadley (2017) and Bilal (2011) argue that in asymmetric 
negotiations, if “a smaller party can augment its power through the skilful use of negotiating strategies 
and tactics” (Jones & Commonwealth, 2013, p. 63) they are not necessarily “at the mercy of the more 
powerful state” (Salacuse 2000, p. 257). Since Brexit, there has been conflict of competing objectives 
between the UK and the EU. The EU wants to make it hard for the UK to exit, while the UK want to 
make Brexit a success. New Zealand is now considered highly strategic to the EU and the UK, a 





New Zealand has been granted limited access into the EU since 1973 due to their historical ties with 
the UK, with an FTA remaining elusive. However in 2018, the EU formally approved FTA negotiations 
with Australia and New Zealand (MFAT, 2018g). The European Commission President, Jean-Claude 
Juncker stated that the “negotiations would be fast tracked” (Patterson, 2018a). The mandate signals 
a multi-billion dollar deal between New Zealand and the EU before the UK exits (Patterson, 2018a). 
According to EU modelling, this would result in between a $1.2 billion and $2 billion GDP boost for 
New Zealand and a 10% to 20% increase in exports, with New Zealand’s agriculture sector being the 
most likely to be benefited by an FTA (Patterson, 2018a). The European markets are a “huge, high 
value market” for New Zealand and one that should be pursued vigorously (Patterson, 2018a).  
 
The EU in comparison will not receive anywhere near the benefits that New Zealand would secure 
through an FTA, with the monetary gains to the EU being minor (Obadovic, 2018, pp. 143-161). Von 
Der Burchard argues that the EU was postponing the resulting talks due to the powerful agriculture 
lobby in the EU that does not want to compete with New Zealand goods (VonDerBurchard, 2017). 
Perhaps most telling is Mr Parker stating that the FTA has “been hanging in the balance even until 
very recently” (Patterson, 2018a), despite New Zealand and the EU announcing an intention to 
negotiate back in 2015. EU farmers fear that once agriculture is liberalised, New Zealand dairy and 
meat products will flood the EU market. New Zealand can expect that lobby groups will be very active 
during FTA negotiations (Obadovic, 2018, p. 57). 
 
However, this depends upon how New Zealand positions itself and the strategies it employs. New 
Zealand needs to correctly leverage and influence the UK and EU so that a favourable FTA is 
negotiated. Despite Brexit remaining in flux, the implications arising from interviews will help inform 
New Zealand's agriculture sector, Government and businesses on policy options. If this process is 
managed and planned for appropriately, this could minimise the negative impact of Brexit on New 
Zealand’s agriculture sector. This section will argue that New Zealand is in a strategic position to 
embrace the opportunities that Brexit presents and mitigate, or at the very least minimise, the 
negative consequences of Brexit.  
 
5.2.1 How do you solve a problem like Maria? Mitigating Brexit’s impact on New 
Zealand’s Agriculture Sector 
 
The potential negative impacts of Brexit include a possible recession in the British economy that will 
place further pressure on New Zealand’s agriculture producers and exporters, a crash-out that could 
jeopardise New Zealand’s global supply chain and a confirmation of the plan to split New Zealand’s 
TRQ’s down historical averages. There are also secondary considerations, such as a soft-Brexit, 




by Brexit and finally, how the UK and EU agriculture producers perceive New Zealand’s agriculture 
sector.  
 
However, this thesis argues that if New Zealand correctly leverages and influences the UK and EU 
and is able to embrace the positive impacts of potential FTAs with both parties, the negative 
implications of Brexit could be avoided, or at the very least mitigated. This can be accomplished 
through New Zealand’s relationships with the UK and the EU. The historical relationship between the 
UK and New Zealand continues to be one of significance and consequently created the basis of its 
relationship with the EU. New Zealand now needs to strengthen its relationship with both parties as 
they undergo changes to their respective regional and domestic politics. Bilal argues that 
international trade must be viewed as the result of ‘a history of political bargains among states of 
differing power capabilities’ (Bilal et al., 2011, p. 1). New Zealand now has the opportunity to 
capitalise on its respective histories with the UK and the EU.  
 
5.2.2 A Free Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom  
 
As was established in section 4.3, the speed of the Brexit decision, the lack of detailed plans prior to 
the British referendum, and the absence of formal precedents for a nation-state to exit the EU has 
created considerable uncertainty which has weakened the May Government’s credibility and 
bargaining power. A trade agreement with New Zealand could be a way to establish some credibility 
on the international scene and with the relationship shared (explained at 3.2), it would be easy to 
accomplish. Leavers and the UK government have made promises to the British public that leaving 
the EU gives the UK the opportunity to “reinvigorate Commonwealth partnerships”, a strategy called 
‘empire 2.0’ (Boffey, 2018a). The end result of the strategy is to turn the UK back into a global power.  
 
Another possibility for the UK is to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), formerly known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This enables 
the UK to “kickstart exports after Brexit” (Mance, Pickard, & Donnan, 2018). The UK needs to gain 
the support of the existing members, of which New Zealand is one. While it would be better for New 
Zealand to get a bilateral trade deal with the UK, rather than a multilateral one (Nine, 2018; 
Obadovic, 2018), New Zealand would still be seen as a strategic ally in joining the CPTPP by the UK, 
which New Zealand could use to their advantage. 
 
Before, during and after the World Wars, New Zealanders descended from the colonial era 
immigrants tended to viewed themselves as British, however by the mid 2000’s New Zealand’s 
national identity had evolved to ‘Kiwi’ (Gibbons, 2008, p. 97). Despite this, in terms of social values, 




most other European countries (Gibbons, 2008, p. 97). New Zealand’s familiarity with the British 
system will help to conclude an FTA with the UK.  
 
One of the more interesting implications that emerged during interviews was the ‘maternal’ sentiment 
that many of the older English guard of UK trade policy portrayed. There are people in the UK who 
are still extremely loyal to New Zealand and view them with the same fondness that saw the UK fight 
for New Zealand’s TRQ access during their accession into the EEC (Gibbons, 2008). New Zealand 
should be trying to deal with the older guard when negotiating a trade deal as far as possible. This 
‘maternal’ sentimentality was not apparent when interviewing their younger counterparts. However, 
New Zealand should not presume that their history with the UK will help them to secure a favourable 
deal. The position that the UK has found themselves in is complicated and they cannot afford to 
compromise any trade deals due to sentiment. Respondent six remarked that trade policy is the cold 
of the cold and questioned how far emotions factor into trade negotiations. However, employing this 
strategy could be a way for New Zealand to remain ‘first in line’ with the UK when the time comes to 
negotiate an FTA.  
 
5.2.3 A Free Trade Agreement with the European Union 
 
The EU has undermined the UK’s strategy of “empire 2.0” by announcing FTA talks with New 
Zealand and Australia before the UK. New Zealand needs to navigate this tension carefully so 
political relationships with the UK and the EU are preserved. As explained in 3.2 and 4.4, New 
Zealand’s relationship with the EU is mainly a consequence of their ties to the UK. 2.4 demonstrates 
how important relationships are to international trade and how these links have been used by New 
Zealand previously to gain access into the EU.  
 
This is a complex space that New Zealand will be operating in and New Zealand’s diplomats and 
respondents will have to work very hard to balance the competing tensions while not being seen to 
be taking advantage of the situation. This flexibility needs to be employed to conclude an FTA with 
the EU quickly, while also fighting for their place against other competing states for an FTA with the 
UK. Due to the size of the EU market compared to the UK and strategizing for the potential 
interruption of New Zealand’s global supply chain, the EU need to be the priority. New Zealand needs 
to strengthen this relationship beyond the UK connection. However, what is important to recognise is 
that by drawing on their shared history and building stronger ties, New Zealand can remain present 








5.2.4 Trade Rate Quotas  
 
TRQ’s are one of the worst potential impacts that will hit New Zealand due to Brexit. However, there 
is cause to be hopeful as there are ways to circumvent splitting TRQ’s on historical grounds. New 
Zealand commonly employs tools used by small states to influence the international order. Small 
states engage in international organizations and draw on international laws and norms to enhance 
their leverage and independence in the world system (Hey, 2003). This is currently a strategy being 
employed by New Zealand and various other nations who are not happy with the way TRQ’s are 
being handled. New Zealand, along with six other nations, including the United States, sent a letter to 
the UK and the EU suggesting that the proposal would not fully honour the existing WTO 
commitments and would leave them worse off (Various, 2017).  
 
As was discussed in 4.5.3.2 New Zealand does not have the desired impact acting alone but allying 
with the USA may help their cause. Involving the WTO in the dispute reminds the EU and UK of their 
obligations under the WTO of honouring TRQ commitments and the principle of not leaving members 
worse off (Various, 2017). The UK is currently trying to establish their own WTO schedules to allow 
for a seamless transition once leaving the EU. Since the interviews have taken place, the UK have 
submitted their draft schedule outlining post-Brexit good commitments. A joint proposal by the UK 
and EU detailing how the TRQ’s would be divided was also submitted to the WTO (Various, 2017). 
The USA, Australia and New Zealand (among others) have rejected the proposal, causing problems 
between the EU and the UK (Boffey, 2018b). The EU have accepted the concerns and are looking for 
alternative ways forward but the UK are insisting that the TRQ’s are split on historical averages 
(Boffey, 2018b).  
 
Three respondents argued the UK needs the WTO at the moment, and therefore it is very important 
for the UK to abide by the WTO rulings. A respondent from New Zealand did remark that “there is a 
way to maintain flexibility but for the moment the UK is pushing ahead” (Seven, 2017). New Zealand 
may have more of an impact on how the TRQ issue is determined than is suggested in 4.5.3.2.  
However, to maintain this pressure New Zealand has to continue to play hardball and remained 
aligned with their allies.  
 
5.2.5 Conclusion: An Opening into a Protected Market  
 
Brexit’s impact upon the international political economy and New Zealand’s market access into the 
EU needs to mitigated carefully as Brexit could have severe economic and political impacts upon 
New Zealand’s agriculture sector. However, while it is a period of significant disruption upon the 




to the UK, but also including the EU. New Zealand has been attempting to gain greater market 
access into the EU but has been rebuffed due to its powerful agriculture lobby. Managed 
appropriately, New Zealand could not only mitigate the effects of Brexit but could also create greater 
market access and a fairer international market that is not distorted by subsidies.  
 
5.3 Three little pigs: Can you anticipate Brexit?  
 
In 2.6, anticipatory governance was discussed in relation to New Zealand. Boston (2017) found that 
New Zealand does have sufficiently future- focused frameworks in place in regard to the resilience of 
New Zealand’s economy. But Boston also argues that New Zealand has considerably further to go if 
they want to achieve true anticipatory governance. While Boston’s criticism is mainly levelled at New 
Zealand’s environmental and future technologies sector, the responses from respondents suggests 
that parts of New Zealand’s agriculture sector are not adequately prepared for Brexit. In 4.4, 
respondents discussed New Zealand maintaining relevance in the UK and the EU. A criticism that 
emerged from respondents was that “New Zealand (Government and businesses) still haven’t quite 
grasped how hard we are going to have to work and what we are going to have to do maintain our 
presence” (Nine, 2018).  
 
Trading blocs such as Mercosur will be looking to capitalise on the vacuums in food supply that Brexit 
may create in the UK. Mercosur, South America’s economic bloc are negotiating a trade agreement 
with the EU (Leahy & Schipani, 2018). These trade negotiations have been ongoing for the last 20 
years and there are still issues surrounding quotas on meat and sugar exports to the EU from 
Mercosur (Leahy & Schipani, 2018). Argentina and Mercosur will have intimate knowledge of the 
UK’s beef sector and know how to fill the gap from the last 20 years of trade negotiations. There is no 
issue of an asymmetric power imbalance as the UK (and EU) have much to gain from being granted 
access into either Argentina or Mercosur (Brunsden & Khan, 2018). An FTA with Mercosur could 
abolish €4 billion in annual customs duties on EU exports (Brunsden & Khan, 2018). When 
considering what Mercosur could offer the UK in terms of exports markets, not to mention the ‘copy 
and paste’ approach mentioned in 4.5.4.2 by states such as South Korea, New Zealand cannot be 
sitting idly by and must fight to retain visibility in the UK and the EU.    
 
5.3.1 Strategies to Anticipate ‘Brexit’ 
 
New Zealand should be taking steps to establish various adaption planning strategies to Brexit 
(Vermeulen et al., 2013). While there is a committee in Wellington considering Brexit issues (Nine, 
2018), anticipating Brexit would be easier for New Zealand to accomplish if there was a dedicated 
future focused ministry or a high-level foresight unit that plans for uncertainty, as is suggested by 




through accounting and planning for every scenario; whether it is a crash-out, a Norway or Swiss 
model.  
 
New Zealand’s agriculture sector will have to account for this in any business plans as uncertainty 
surrounds Brexit and confuses New Zealand interests. Other policies suggested would be to put an 
economic and political development team in the UK (Nine, 2018), whose sole responsibility is 
investigating Brexit and potential pathways for maximising or mitigating potential impacts. Businesses 
and government should be working cooperatively towards developing marketing strategies that are 
specific for each bloc. While the UK and EU are similar, they are still separate markets with their own 
preferences. New Zealand needs to make sure that certain export strategies are in place and are 
clearly enunciated for both the EU and UK. 4.4 makes it clear there are concerns surrounding small 
New Zealand businesses that lack knowledge of how international trade functions, specifically how 
tariffs diminish returns on an exported good (Nine, 2018). This is something that could be easily fixed 
with a targeted communications strategy for businesses and the export sector. Due to the importance 
of trade to New Zealand, the Government and businesses should be collaboratively implementing 
education programs that fosters greater understanding. This should be a priority for the agriculture 
sector and not just targeted towards businesses, but so that New Zealand’s population has a general 
understanding of international trade.  
 
5.3.2 Team work  
 
Occupying a strategic position has already been discussed above, but another advantage that Jones 
(2013) discusses is whether the small state has sound political leadership and technical skills to 
deploy an astute negotiating strategy. If held constant, small states can exert substantial influence. 
This is an area that Katzenstein (1985) also touches on, albeit in different wording. He argues that 
consensus and pragmatism are two fundamental conditions that are needed for a small state to 
maintain flexibility in periods of economic shocks. In 4.4, New Zealand’s bi-partisan trade policy was 
discussed where respondents stated that, despite a change in government in 2017, New Zealand’s 
trade sector is bi-partisan. New Zealand may have only formally proposed an FTA with the EU back 
in 2009 but the planning stages would have been going on for years beforehand. The National 
Government gained power in November 2008 but the organisation needed to deploy a negotiation 
strategy would have begun during Helen Clark’s Labour Government (One, 2017). The consensus 
between the two major parties is evident due to the importance of trade to the New Zealand 
economy. This relatively coherent trade strategy has allowed New Zealand to become masters in the 
field of international trade, and several respondents expressed the view that New Zealand is very well 
respected in the field (Nine, 2018). It is easy to conclude from above that New Zealand has the 
political leadership, technical skills, consensus and pragmatism needed to negotiate and conclude an 





However, as was discussed in 4.4, New Zealand’s government may not be aware of how hard they 
are going to have to work to remain present and relevant to the UK and the EU during this period. By 
implementing the strategies discussed in 5.3.1, New Zealand should be able to anticipate the impacts 
of Brexit and remain present to the UK and the EU.  
 
5.3.3 Know how, can do   
 
Regardless of what model the British and the EU decide upon, the EU will not continue to subsidize 
British farmers through CAP. This means that the UK Government will have to have to decide 
between continuing funding their own version of CAP at current levels or restructuring how the British 
agriculture sector is run and liberalising parts of the sector.  
 
As established in chapter 3, CAP distorts agriculture markets and stops exports (to a degree) from 
entering the EU. This makes it very hard for New Zealand producers to compete. Full liberalisation of 
the UK and EU agriculture sector is unlikely (Obadovic, 2018). However, there is a possibility that the 
UK will reform parts of their agriculture sector as they will be unable to afford to fund the current rates 
of subsidies. If the UK succeeds in their endeavour, the EU may follow suit.  
 
In 2.4, Lynch (2012) was quoted as saying that small states may be able to achieve influence through 
“illuminating lesser known paths” to other states (Lynch, 2013, p. 20). As was also established in 2.3 
and 3.3, New Zealand completely liberalised their agriculture sector and as a result gained a 
comparative advantage in agriculture products. This is something of interest to the UK. The UK have 
been sending delegations to New Zealand to see what New Zealand did during the 1980’s and what 
they are doing now. As one respondent said, “we are not telling them what to do but there are some 
useful lessons in what we did in the 1980’s” (Seven, 2017). New Zealand needs to capitalise on this. 
In 3.5 it was stated that 60% of UK farm incomes come from the EU and that without these subsidies 
90% of farms would fail. It was estimated that 8000 farmers would lose their farms in New Zealand 
during the 1980’s reforms and yet this did not eventuate. Educating the UK on how New Zealand 
liberalised their agriculture sector has the potential to influence a CAP reform that would benefit New 
Zealand’s agriculture sector. New Zealand needs to encourage more delegations to and from the UK 
and become more involved in the UK agriculture sector through educating farmers on the advantages 
of liberalising the agriculture sector.  
 
Encouraging delegations and becoming more involved in the UK’s agriculture sector serves a further 
purpose. In 4.5.4.4, New Zealand’s image in the UK and the EU was discussed. It was found that 
despite New Zealand enjoying a reputation in the world as an excellent producer and exporter of high 




they are scared of the threat that New Zealand goods would pose to their own or because they are 
misinformed, this viewpoint needs to be corrected. New Zealand will not be able to take advantage of 
the opportunities Brexit is offering if they are let down by their own image in the UK and EU. Opening 
a dialogue with UK farmers and continuing delegations that include UK farmers is a way to 
circumvent the negative image of New Zealand’s agriculture goods in the UK and the EU.   
 
5.3.4 A Helpful Hand  
 
Brexit is not only going to affect the UK, the EU and New Zealand; the whole international political 
economy will have to adapt to the changes that Brexit will bring. New Zealand respondents made it 
very clear that while they do not want to take advantage of Brexit, they do not want to be adversely 
affected by it either. A crash-out situation is the worst possible outcome for all parties involved and 
the wider international political economy. Therefore it is in New Zealand’s interest to work together 
and in the most orderly way possible (Seven, 2017) with not only the UK and EU but the rest of the 
world. Relationships are vital and strengthening them through being cooperative and not complicating 
the process is a way to maintain the status quo and remain present and relevant.  
 
5.3.5 Huh, We Like That Too! 
 
New Zealanders have particular food preferences and therefore New Zealand’s agriculture sector 
supplies what New Zealanders demand. According to several respondents, New Zealanders prefer 
their food to be as natural as possible, therefore the farming sector produce grass fed, hormone free, 
antibiotic free, GM free goods (Nine, 2018). The UK also hold the same preferences for food and 
therefore are very particular about the food they eat. New Zealand needs to capitalise on their natural 
production of agriculture goods as this is in line with what the UK population demands. It also gives 
New Zealand a slight edge over any other competitors, such as the United States. In 1989, the EU 
banned beef that has hormones in it from being imported (Stephany, 2001). The United States, 
however, use hormones in their beef. This gives New Zealand an advantage over competitors as 
there is no point exporting a good that the naturalised population will not eat. There is also the 
opportunity to fill the niche gap of fine food, if the UK is no longer able to source these goods from 
other European countries. NZ lamb in particular is considered a finer food in the UK (Three, 2017).  
 
5.3.6 The Flexibility to Avoid Brexit 
 
As a small state, New Zealand has an inherent flexibility that enables it to manoeuvre quickly when 
confronted with tension and changes in spheres of influence in the international political economy, a 
derivative power that enables them to obtain, commit and manipulate the power of more powerful 




impacts of Brexit. The above strategies offer ways in which New Zealand can navigate considerable 
uncertainty, while simultaneously evolving its relationships with both the UK and EU so that New 
Zealand can embrace the opportunities that have presented themselves via the process of ‘Brexit’ 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
Chapter 5 discussed the themes identified in Chapter 4 in greater depth in in relation to how New 
Zealand ought to position itself to maximize leverage and influence the subsequent and future 
international trade negotiations with the EU and UK. Overall, despite there being some anticipatory 
issues that New Zealand’s agriculture sector need to address, New Zealand is in a good position to 
navigate the inherent tension between the UK and the EU and leverage the UK and the EU into 
FTA’s that will minimise the negative impacts of Brexit. However, it is important that New Zealand 
strengthens its relationships with both the UK and the EU and in particular fosters its relationship with 
the EU outside of the UK’s orbit. New Zealand must not be seen to be taking advantage of Brexit, 
rather New Zealand should be an ally in the process of Brexit. The similarities between New Zealand 
and the UK and EU will help New Zealand to facilitate a trade agreement with the UK when the time 
comes. However, the EU at this stage must be the priority and efforts need to be concentrated upon 
strengthening New Zealand’s relationship with the EU outside of the UK’s influence.  
 
Chapter 6 will conclude this thesis by summarising the research analysis and responding to the 
research aim. Recommendations and the limitations of this case study will be offered as will potential 
avenues of research. Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude that New Zealand’s nature as a small state can 










This thesis sought to explore the short and long term diplomatic and trade risks and opportunities for 
New Zealand’s agriculture sector, providing insights into the complexities of the Brexit negotiations 
and their potential outcomes. It aimed to critically examine how New Zealand ought to position itself 
to maximise leverage and influence future and subsequent international trade negotiations with the 
UK and EU as a result of Brexit. Semi-structured interviews with fifteen respondents from both New 
Zealand and UK were analysed in conjunction with grey literature and mass media to meet the 
following objectives: 
 
1. To review the literature of small state trade and determine in what ways and to what extent we 
might expect global forces and larger economic and political powers to influence New Zealand  
2. To interview key economic and political actors in international agriculture trade, specifically 
with a background in New Zealand, UK and EU agriculture trade policy, and document how 
New Zealand’s agriculture sector is responding to Brexit  
3. To determine the threats and opportunities posed by Brexit for New Zealand agriculture trade 
4. To discuss the implications of the research findings and identify opportunities for New 
Zealand to re-assess its relationship with the UK and EU around agriculture trade in beneficial 
ways 
 
This final chapter will conclude the thesis and consist of a summary, recommendations, limitations, 
areas for further study, and final comments. Overall, this thesis has argued that despite creating a  
period of critical disruption to the international political economy (Barber, 2016; Brinded, 2016), Brexit 
has is a vital trade negotiation opportunity for New Zealand. Brexit has opened up new trade 
opportunities, not only restricted to the UK, but also including the EU (MFAT, 2018b; Patterson, 
2018b). I conclude that New Zealand is in a good position to navigate the inherent tension between 
the UK and the EU and leverage the UK and the EU into FTA’s that will minimise the negative 
impacts of Brexit. 
 
6.2 Summary of Thesis  
 
Using a case study approach, Brexit, New Zealand and Agriculture Trade were examined in depth 
throughout this thesis. The body of this text produced a framework explaining how a small state 
adapts to changes in the international political economy and navigates international pressures and 
tensions. Chapter 1 introduced the topic of Agricultural trade and its importance to New Zealand and 




qualitative research. Chapter 2 contextualised the issue of agricultural trade policy for New Zealand 
in a post-Brexit world by reviewing the literatures on small states in the international political 
economy, asymmetric negotiations, and anticipatory governance. Taken together, these three 
approaches suggest small states are able to adapt to adverse disruption in the international political 
economy through their inherent flexibility and seize upon opportunities that may present. In addition, 
a framework was created for determining how New Zealand may strategically position itself to 
leverage the UK and EU so that the worst impacts of Brexit are anticipated and mitigated. Chapter 3 
presented a history of New Zealand’s agriculture trade, through examining New Zealand’s colonial 
past with the UK and subsequent relationship with the EU, and how New Zealand re-orientated itself 
after the UK joined the EEC. Chapter 3 briefly detailed why Brexit happened and what has occurred 
in the international political economy immediately thereafter. Ultimately, reviewing the history of New 
Zealand’s agriculture trade contextualised current relations and gave a deeper understanding of why 
Brexit should be studied in conjunction with New Zealand’s agriculture trade sector. In Chapter 4, I 
reported the results of the semi-structured interviews with the fifteen political and economic actors 
and analysed the results by clustering the commentaries into themes. The key themes that emerged, 
and which are discussed above, were: uncertainty, New Zealand’s relationships with the UK and the 
EU, and potential impacts. These themes provided insights into the complexities of the Brexit 
negotiations and their potential outcomes. Chapter 5 discussed these themes in greater depth in 
relation to how New Zealand ought to position itself to maximize leverage and influence the 
subsequent and future international trade negotiations with the EU and UK.  
 
6.3 Recommendations  
 
Since the 1970’s New Zealand has been forced to develop a flexible trade policy and a domestic 
spirit of political cooperation as a result of international market exposure and the strategic 
disadvantages of small size in negotiating international terms of trade (Hoadley, 2017; Katzenstein, 
1985; Keating, 2016). According to respondents, New Zealand has become well regarded in the 
international political economy and frequently ‘punches above its weight’ (Köllner, 2018). Despite this, 
there are both risks, and opportunities involved in New Zealand’s trade negotiations with both the UK 
and EU post-Brexit. New Zealand now needs to employ all of its considerable skill to navigate the 
tensions that have erupted between the UK and the EU due to competing objectives and the 
subsequent uncertainty that has transpired. Originally my thesis was limited to the bilateral 
relationship between New Zealand and the UK as initial commentary suggested that Brexit might 
merely be a period of critical disruption to the international political economy (Barber, 2016; Brinded, 
2016). However, in the months that followed, Brexit has been reinterpreted as a vital trade 
negotiation opportunity for New Zealand. Brexit has opened up new trade opportunities, not only 





This section outlines recommendations for New Zealand in navigating a post-Brexit environment, as 
discussed by respondents and analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis:  
 
• New Zealand businesses and Government should be aware that a ‘crash-out’ is still possible 
and should be doing everything in their power to strategize ways around its impact on New 
Zealand’s agriculture sector. 
• New Zealand must focus on growing and strengthening its relationships with both the UK and 
the EU in order to mitigate the potential negative impacts of Brexit on New Zealand’s 
agriculture sector as remaining present and relevant is of the utmost importance.  
• New Zealand needs to position itself accordingly but cannot be seen to be taking advantage 
of Brexit. 
• New Zealand’s primary focus needs to be with the EU at the moment due to the FTA being 
negotiated between New Zealand and the EU.  
• New Zealand should utilise its expertise gained in the area of agriculture reforms in the 1980s. 
This is a way to remain relevant and also an opportunity to influence a reformed CAP in the 
UK that could be beneficial for New Zealand. This could encourage the EU to look at their 
own CAP. Potential reforms to the CAP may re-level the playing field of the agriculture 
market, meaning New Zealand may no longer have to compete against a subsidised product. 
• New Zealand needs to focus refreshing its image of agriculture goods in the UK and EU.  
• In regard to the TRQ’s, New Zealand needs to keep the pressure on the UK and the EU and 
continue discussions and fostering relationships with allies.  
• Small New Zealand businesses are missing out on returns because they are overlooking 
small details in international trade. The New Zealand Government and businesses need to 
work together to prioritise improving an understanding of international trade. A targeted 
communication strategy between agricultural businesses and the relevant government 
agencies can foster depth of understanding in relation to the role that small business plays in 
the New Zealand economy as a whole.  
• New Zealand needs to embrace the idea of anticipatory governance – being a small state 
gives inherent flexibility but improving anticipatory governance through having a future 
focused ministry and putting an economic and political development team on the ground in 
the UK and the EU would give New Zealand an added advantage  
• New Zealand should consider ways to fill a niche within the international agriculture market, 
including through continuing to produce agricultural goods that are as natural as possible and 





Taking into consideration these recommendations may serve as a starting point for New Zealand in 
considering how New Zealand ought to position itself to maximise leverage and influence future and 
subsequent international trade negotiations with the UK and EU as a result of Brexit.  
 
6.4 Limitations  
 
Despite its relevance and contribution to the conversation about the effects Brexit may have on small 
states, there are two major limitations to this research that should be mentioned. Firstly, it is based 
primarily on speculation from respondents, as no one can say for certain what is going to happen or 
how New Zealand should respond. Secondly, the sample of respondents was limited due to the 
nature of the thesis and a lack of time and resources, and the perspectives of people with sole 
allegiance to the EU or the perspectives of UK and EU farmers have not been included.  
 
6.5 Areas for further research  
 
The themes that have emerged from this thesis are suggestive of a number of opportunities for 
further research. Economic modelling of the exact impact of a ‘crash-out’ on New Zealand’s 
agriculture sector would be beneficial, as would specific research into how small New Zealand 
businesses should approach international trade. The exact areas of international trade that New 
Zealand needs to improve upon, and more detail and recommendations around this would ensure 
greater clarity around opportunities for New Zealand in a Post-Brexit environment moving forward. 
 
6.6 Final comments 
 
On the 23rd of June 2016, the UK initiated Brexit; a decision that could have severe economic and 
political implications for New Zealand in respect to agricultural trade. New Zealand and the UK have 
a strong relationship that was established in colonial times, which consequently formed the basis of 
New Zealand’s ensuing agriculture relationship with the EU. However, with the UK initiating the 
process of Brexit there is now a chance to re-assess the economic trade relationship with both the 
UK and the EU via FTA’s. New Zealand needs to adapt to the changing international political 
economy, while simultaneously evolving its relationships with both the UK and EU as they undergo 
changes to their respective regional and domestic politics. Subsequently, New Zealand will have to 
navigate considerable uncertainty to avoid the negative implications created so that New Zealand can 
embrace the opportunities that have presented themselves via the process of ‘Brexit’. It is important 
that New Zealand is not seen to be taking advantage of Brexit, rather that New Zealand is an ally in 
this process. However, New Zealand is in a good position to navigate the inherent tension between 
the UK and the EU and leverage the UK and the EU into FTA’s that will minimise the negative 
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Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
1) There is some speculation about the future of Brexit. Do you think that  
a. Brexit will happen 
b. If so, what form will Brexit take 
c. What form will be most beneficial to New Zealand 
2) What are in your opinion the biggest risks for New Zealand Agriculture 
3) Biggest opportunities  
4) What do you think are the key TRQ challenges for New Zealand?  
5) Recently in the news the UK has said they are interested in joining the TTP  
a. What sort of trade model is the NZ government pursing with both the UK and the EU? 
6) What strategies should the New Zealand government and businesses be implementing to minimise 
the risks of Brexit  
7) We have had a change in government with the Labour party, Green Party and New Zealand First 
setting up a coalition government – Will this have an impact on our trade agenda? 
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